On 19^th November 2024, the President of Abkhazia Aslan Bzhania resigned following protest after the ‘Apartment Bill’ was withdrawn by the Parliament earlier in July. The Bill allowed non-residents (Russians) to build and buy real estate properties in Abkhazia. Russia retaliated by withholding its financial aid until restrictions on Russian investors in the real estate market were removed. When the Abkhaz Parliament ratified a bill to cater to Russian demands, protests broke out, with protesters storming government buildings.

This resignation adds to the tensions within Abkhazia and the tangled political dynamics of the region. This small Caucasian territory with very limited international recognition is theoretically a part of Georgia. Abkhazia declared independence after a conflict with Georgia in 1992-3. This resulted in a mass exodus as Georgia was unable to control the separatist region. Another violent outbreak in 1998 and then the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 resulted in further distancing between Sukhumi (Abkhazia’s capital) and Tbilisi (Georgia’s capital). Although Abkhazia became ‘independent’ from Georgia, it also became dependent on Moscow. Russia is one of the few countries that recognises Abkhazian independence; it has built military and naval basis on its territory – which now hold immense strategic significance for Russia given its occupation in the Black Sea –, provided economic support, and delivered passports with the Russian double-headed eagle on the cover to its citizens.

The last thirty years of Abkhazian history share similarities with other territories of the former Soviet Union. After the fall of the USSR, separatist movements erupting in former satellite states of the USSR were exploited by Moscow to retain its control. Russian meddling has impacted Transnistria, the other breakaway region in Georgia, South Ossetia, and the old “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk, or the no longer existing Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh. Abkhazia, however, distinguishes itself because of a unique feature: it challenged its patron, Russia.

Both Georgia and Abkhazia offer a unique paradox. In Georgia, the ‘Georgian Dream’ party, owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili, an oligarch with ties to Moscow (and accused of rigging the elections) has made strides to improve relations with Russia, which currently occupies part of its territory. In the last months, the Georgian Parliament enacted laws which aligned with the ones passed in Duma in Moscow. For example, one law limits the rights of the LGBT community, and another on ‘foreign agents’ requires any entity that receives more than 20% of its funding from abroad to declare itself an ‘organisation representing the interests of a foreign country’. Simultaneously, however, Abkhazia, a territory so dependent on Russia, shows resistance to at least one Russian diktat, even going so far as to force its President to resign.

The Caucasus is a strategically significant area for Russia, whose mountains are the only real geographical border between the Federation, but its populations have challenged Russian interference. The territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia now constitute Russia's last Caucasian stronghold: the two wars in which Azerbaijan reclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh marked the rise of Baku (in tandem with Ankara) whilst the lack of support for Armenia alienated Yerevan. In the rest of Georgia, Russia has had a poor reputation since its invasion in 2008, and the fact that it is now being challenged by separatist republics it maintains control on, means that the regional picture is rather bleak from a Russian point of view.

Regardless, for Sukhumi, the prospects of completely breaking away from Russia are unrealistic, irrespective of the growing discontent with the current status quo. This is paradoxical, given that it owes its ‘independence’ to Russian intervention and protection: Moscow has committed to retaliate against Georgia should it try to reconquer Abkhazia. The November 2024 protests were preceded by other tense moments in both 2021 and 2022, but it has been ten years since such a widespread unrest where Abkhazians stormed government buildings and forced the then President Alexander Ankvab to resign. Hence, while uprisings, even violent ones, are no novelty in Abkhazia, the fact that they are directed against a decision emanating from Moscow marks a new dynamic in recent years. Aware of their subordinate position, the Abkhazian demonstrators made it clear that their acts were not to be interpreted as anti-Russian. Abkhazians cannot forget the grip of Russia over their country – the influence it has on their economy and the presence of Russian military and naval bases on their territory.

Russia supported Abkhazian separatism to maintain influence at its borders, and to break Tbilisi’s territorial integrity, making it less attractive to other states and preventing it from joining other alliances. Today, the success of this policy can be challenged, as the vassal state of Abkhazia appears reluctant to obey the orders of an increasingly unattractive, isolated, and ostensibly economically rapacious master.
For Georgia, however, the conditions are not ripe enough to capitalise on Abkhazia-Russia frictions and to regain territorial integrity. The last elections are said to be rigged, which has resulted in tensions across the country. On one hand, the opposition is emphasizing on the European future of the country, which will likely make it difficult to build peaceful relations with the neighbouring Russia. On the other hand, the Government in Tbilisi is betting on a strategy of appeasement with Moscow, although one may doubt its sincerity in a country where wounds of Russian invasion are still fresh and where the Georgian Dream presented itself as a party of peace in order to win the last elections, and its decision to delay EU membership talks to 2028 has reignited vibrant street protests.

Tbilisi also has domestic reasons to be more accommodating towards Moscow. Since the invasion, there has been an influx of Russians settling in the country allowing Georgia to receive better economic opportunities by circumventing the sanctions, e.g., exporting directly to Russia or in triangulation with other countries.

The Georgian-Abkhazian relations had been subjected to frozen conflicts inherited from the dissolution of the USSR which seemed impossible to resolve given Russia’s willingness to exploit them for its foreign policy advantage. However, now that the Federation is embroiled in the War in Ukraine and its regional influence declining, different and seemingly unpredictable scenarios are becoming possibilities – where local and regional actors are ready to take advantage of the weakening of a state who has been the regional hegemon for the past 200 years.