by manlio graziano
Backyard Brawl between Nuclear Powers
This image was generated with ChatGPT.
Anyone betting today on the worsening of international disorder wouldn’t win much.
Anyone betting on whether the current state of international disorder might grow still worse wouldn’t win much.
To today’s era of generalized disorder, we must now add two nuclear-armed countries in conflict with each other. The opening of the Pandora’s box of borders feeds the appetites of some and the fears of others. And so it is that we now see Donald Trump’s chaos reverberating in South Asia and worsening the global condition.
With this latest conflict between India and Pakistan still at an early stage, it is difficult to confidently assess exactly what is happening and project specific outcomes. We can, however, try to piece together some instructive reflections using the tools geopolitics offers us.
What does India want?
This is the core of the riddle, and one can only venture hypotheses. In recent years, India has played the role of a confident, stable, and reliable emerging power, so much so as to nurture the – albeit excessive – ambition of becoming the leader of the so-called “Global South.” On issues of war and nuclear threats, Narendra Modi even took the liberty of scolding Putin.
Reigniting the petty dispute with Pakistan seems to run counter to the strategy carefully cultivated over the years by Modi and his Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Instead of projecting India as a global power, it pulls the country back into its narrow regional backyard—into a conflict that began nearly eighty years ago and has never been resolved. Sure, the stakes in Kashmir are high, but a country that wants to be a great power should be able to act on a higher level, through a network of influences (clients, no allies, etc.), and not with the same impatience for war shown by Russia – which in fact is not and never will be a great power.
But there was the April 22 attack, one might object, and India had to respond. Well, not necessarily. Terror attacks, like any other incident, can be played down or on the contrary emphasized according to what one wants to achieve. There are two examples of such emphasis that serve as lessons – and probably have served New Delhi: the first is 9/11, and the second is October 7, 2023. Horrific attacks, no doubt (as is the stupidity of terrorists, who for two hundred years have always achieved the opposite of what they intended, without ever learning). The first was used as a pretext by the U.S. for a long-planned military operation against Iraq. The second was used by Israel to rid itself of the Palestinians once and for all, a project that started long before the October 7 massacre and has been gradually implemented by all governments since Ben Gurion.
To simplify, one could say that Kashmir is to India what Gaza and the West Bank are to Israel. And like Gaza and the West Bank in Israel, Kashmir was originally an almost exclusively Muslim region. Since August 1947, India and Pakistan have both claimed full sovereignty over Kashmir and have clashed militarily multiple times, before and after the creation of a ceasefire line between the Indian and Pakistani parts. After its victorious war against India in 1962, China also took a piece of the region (Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley).
In August 2019, New Delhi revoked the special status (i.e., all autonomy) of the part under control, where a decades-long process of colonization and demographic replacement of the Muslim population with Hindus is underway – much like what Beijing has done in Tibet and Xinjiang, and Israel has done and continues to do in the West Bank and now Gaza.
The gear was shifted by Trump, who gave the go-ahead for “everyone for themselves.” For decades since WWII, the U.S. had been the guarantor of the inviolability of borders worldwide. Today, they are the first to violate that guarantee. If Washington can threaten to annex Canada or Greenland with impunity and allow Israel to do what it is doing in Gaza without consequences, then every country that has long waited for the chance to reclaim what they believe is “theirs” now feels emboldened to act.
Anyone betting on whether the current state of international disorder might grow still worse wouldn’t win much.
To today’s era of generalized disorder, we must now add two nuclear-armed countries in conflict with each other. The opening of the Pandora’s box of borders feeds the appetites of some and the fears of others. And so it is that we now see Donald Trump’s chaos reverberating in South Asia and worsening the global condition.
With this latest conflict between India and Pakistan still at an early stage, it is difficult to confidently assess exactly what is happening and project specific outcomes. We can, however, try to piece together some instructive reflections using the tools geopolitics offers us.
What does India want?
This is the core of the riddle, and one can only venture hypotheses. In recent years, India has played the role of a confident, stable, and reliable emerging power, so much so as to nurture the – albeit excessive – ambition of becoming the leader of the so-called “Global South.” On issues of war and nuclear threats, Narendra Modi even took the liberty of scolding Putin.
Reigniting the petty dispute with Pakistan seems to run counter to the strategy carefully cultivated over the years by Modi and his Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Instead of projecting India as a global power, it pulls the country back into its narrow regional backyard—into a conflict that began nearly eighty years ago and has never been resolved. Sure, the stakes in Kashmir are high, but a country that wants to be a great power should be able to act on a higher level, through a network of influences (clients, no allies, etc.), and not with the same impatience for war shown by Russia – which in fact is not and never will be a great power.
But there was the April 22 attack, one might object, and India had to respond. Well, not necessarily. Terror attacks, like any other incident, can be played down or on the contrary emphasized according to what one wants to achieve. There are two examples of such emphasis that serve as lessons – and probably have served New Delhi: the first is 9/11, and the second is October 7, 2023. Horrific attacks, no doubt (as is the stupidity of terrorists, who for two hundred years have always achieved the opposite of what they intended, without ever learning). The first was used as a pretext by the U.S. for a long-planned military operation against Iraq. The second was used by Israel to rid itself of the Palestinians once and for all, a project that started long before the October 7 massacre and has been gradually implemented by all governments since Ben Gurion.
To simplify, one could say that Kashmir is to India what Gaza and the West Bank are to Israel. And like Gaza and the West Bank in Israel, Kashmir was originally an almost exclusively Muslim region. Since August 1947, India and Pakistan have both claimed full sovereignty over Kashmir and have clashed militarily multiple times, before and after the creation of a ceasefire line between the Indian and Pakistani parts. After its victorious war against India in 1962, China also took a piece of the region (Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley).
In August 2019, New Delhi revoked the special status (i.e., all autonomy) of the part under control, where a decades-long process of colonization and demographic replacement of the Muslim population with Hindus is underway – much like what Beijing has done in Tibet and Xinjiang, and Israel has done and continues to do in the West Bank and now Gaza.
The gear was shifted by Trump, who gave the go-ahead for “everyone for themselves.” For decades since WWII, the U.S. had been the guarantor of the inviolability of borders worldwide. Today, they are the first to violate that guarantee. If Washington can threaten to annex Canada or Greenland with impunity and allow Israel to do what it is doing in Gaza without consequences, then every country that has long waited for the chance to reclaim what they believe is “theirs” now feels emboldened to act.
And Pakistan?
New Delhi accused Pakistan of being responsible for the April 22 attack. But accusing Pakistan means little – because “Pakistan” as a unified entity does not really exist.
There is a government in Islamabad, supported by some military factions that have more or less held power since 1947; there is a gagged but significant civilian opposition; there’s the intelligence service (ISI), long implicated in murky regional operations—including the creation of the Taliban, support for various militant groups, and a sort of permanent guerrilla against its own government; there are self-proclaimed jihadist militias (including the Taliban themselves), partly serving local warlords, partly exclusively “serving God”; there’s an independence movement in Balochistan; in the northeast lies powerful Punjab (Lahore), always at odds with the southern Sindh (Karachi); there’s the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, largely out of control; and then there’s the rebellious southwestern Balochistan, where lies the much-hyped Gwadar port – expected to be the jewel of Chinese crownin the Indian Ocean for the past ten years, so far unsuccessfully. Not to mention Afghanistan – external, but not really – where half the Pashtun population lives and dreams of reuniting with their kin in Pakistan since the end of the 19th century. Since August 2021, the two countries have been in a state of latent (sometimes open) conflict.
So, when one talks about Pakistan, it’s unclear what is being referred to. What is certain is that after the first Afghan war (1979–1988), some of the aforementioned actors—likely more than one—redirected large numbers of mujahideen (Islamist guerrilla fighters) into Kashmir to wage war against India.. These mujahideen, ungovernable by nature, eventually acted independently – even against the interests of the Pakistan that armed and funded them.
Identifying who was behind the April 22 attack – for which Islamabad had called for an independent investigation – is as difficult as it is easy to blame Pakistan if it serves a purpose.
New Delhi accused Pakistan of being responsible for the April 22 attack. But accusing Pakistan means little – because “Pakistan” as a unified entity does not really exist.
There is a government in Islamabad, supported by some military factions that have more or less held power since 1947; there is a gagged but significant civilian opposition; there’s the intelligence service (ISI), long implicated in murky regional operations—including the creation of the Taliban, support for various militant groups, and a sort of permanent guerrilla against its own government; there are self-proclaimed jihadist militias (including the Taliban themselves), partly serving local warlords, partly exclusively “serving God”; there’s an independence movement in Balochistan; in the northeast lies powerful Punjab (Lahore), always at odds with the southern Sindh (Karachi); there’s the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, largely out of control; and then there’s the rebellious southwestern Balochistan, where lies the much-hyped Gwadar port – expected to be the jewel of Chinese crownin the Indian Ocean for the past ten years, so far unsuccessfully. Not to mention Afghanistan – external, but not really – where half the Pashtun population lives and dreams of reuniting with their kin in Pakistan since the end of the 19th century. Since August 2021, the two countries have been in a state of latent (sometimes open) conflict.
So, when one talks about Pakistan, it’s unclear what is being referred to. What is certain is that after the first Afghan war (1979–1988), some of the aforementioned actors—likely more than one—redirected large numbers of mujahideen (Islamist guerrilla fighters) into Kashmir to wage war against India.. These mujahideen, ungovernable by nature, eventually acted independently – even against the interests of the Pakistan that armed and funded them.
Identifying who was behind the April 22 attack – for which Islamabad had called for an independent investigation – is as difficult as it is easy to blame Pakistan if it serves a purpose.
Some Preliminary Reflections
In the context of rapidly expanding political chaos, two developments stand out:
So far, international reactions have been minimal. And even if they weren’t, they would be irrelevant to analysis – official statements will merely echo António Guterres’ continuous futile pleas for “moderation,” which of course have no effect.
What really matters is what China does and says – as Pakistan’s international patron (assuming Beijing knows who to talk to in Pakistan). China also has an interest in calming India’s belligerence. The U.S. would matter too, if itknew what it wants. India is supposedly its partner – just like Pakistan once was, even after creating the Taliban and hiding Bin Laden. India also remains Russia’s closest friend since its 1962 war with China. A U.S.–Russia rapprochement could help New Delhi, and perhaps the recent shoulder pats between Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and Vladimir Putin were read by India as a green light on Kashmir. But if Washington dreams of a triumvirate with Moscow and Beijing (unlikely but not impossible), India will have to act maturely and stop bickering with Islamabad like a schoolyard bully.
In a world governed by rational political calculations, Washington, Beijing, and Moscow – not to mention the Europeans who hopedto recruit India into their “coalition of the willing” – should cool things down after a few missiles and casualties. But today, the world is no longer governed by rational calculations.
In Conclusion
It is worth recalling that some years ago, a grassroots movement in Kashmir – supported by both Muslims and Hindus on both sides of the armistice line – called for independence to end the India–Pakistan dispute. In swiftly rejecting that demand, Islamabad and New Delhi found themselves, for the first and only time, in full agreement on a Kashmir-related issue.
In the context of rapidly expanding political chaos, two developments stand out:
- The enthusiastic support of both countries’ populations for the conflict. Kant’s idea that people, if allowed to vote, would always choose peace over war because they have more to lose, has been disproven many times – and is again today. While Israeli or Russian popular support for their wars may stem from low personal risk, the case of India and Pakistan is different.
- The risks are enormous. Both countries have nuclear weapons – and while this doesn't mean they will use them, it means the supposed “balance of terror” is visibly unraveling as a deterrent. Pakistan is disproportionately weaker than India and thus more likely to threaten nuclear use as a last resort.
So far, international reactions have been minimal. And even if they weren’t, they would be irrelevant to analysis – official statements will merely echo António Guterres’ continuous futile pleas for “moderation,” which of course have no effect.
What really matters is what China does and says – as Pakistan’s international patron (assuming Beijing knows who to talk to in Pakistan). China also has an interest in calming India’s belligerence. The U.S. would matter too, if itknew what it wants. India is supposedly its partner – just like Pakistan once was, even after creating the Taliban and hiding Bin Laden. India also remains Russia’s closest friend since its 1962 war with China. A U.S.–Russia rapprochement could help New Delhi, and perhaps the recent shoulder pats between Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and Vladimir Putin were read by India as a green light on Kashmir. But if Washington dreams of a triumvirate with Moscow and Beijing (unlikely but not impossible), India will have to act maturely and stop bickering with Islamabad like a schoolyard bully.
In a world governed by rational political calculations, Washington, Beijing, and Moscow – not to mention the Europeans who hopedto recruit India into their “coalition of the willing” – should cool things down after a few missiles and casualties. But today, the world is no longer governed by rational calculations.
In Conclusion
It is worth recalling that some years ago, a grassroots movement in Kashmir – supported by both Muslims and Hindus on both sides of the armistice line – called for independence to end the India–Pakistan dispute. In swiftly rejecting that demand, Islamabad and New Delhi found themselves, for the first and only time, in full agreement on a Kashmir-related issue.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.