BY Arman Ahmed
Bangladesh’s 2026 Election: Domestic Politics and Geopolitical Realignments
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Bangladesh is scheduled to hold its 13th national parliamentary elections on 12th February 2026. For the first time, the country’s two leading political parties will contest the election without their core leaders. Sheikh Hasina, chairperson of the Awami League and former prime minister (1996–2001; 2009–2024), resigned and fled to India following widespread social unrest in August 2024. Khalida Zia, former prime minister (1991–1996; 2001–2006) and chairperson of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), passed away in December 2025.
As interim leader, Muhammad Yunus oversees the electoral process; the resulting political vacuum is being filled by a mix of established and emerging political factions, complicating the canvas. Simultaneously, the election's outcome will also have significant implications for the geopolitical configuration of South Asia. Although the election is expected to determine the next government after a period of prolonged instability, it remains to be seen whether the next government can offer stability at home and abroad.
The Shifting Domestic Political Environment
On one hand is the Awami League – created by the Bangladesh’s ‘founding father’ Sheikh Mujib – which has been the dominant ruling party for decades; its historic roots in the liberation movement from Pakistan accorded it with widespread support. Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Sheikh Mujib) served multiple terms as prime minister and was the longest‑serving leader in Bangladesh’s history. However, in July 2024, social unrest erupted against Hasina’s rule, marked by a poor human rights record, bleak economic outlook, suppression of political dissent, and claims of rigged elections. Following Hasina’s ouster, the interim government banned the Awami League under the Anti‑Terrorism Act and suspended its electoral registration, effectively removing it from the February ballot. Thousands of its members and affiliated activists faced arrests, legal cases, and exile. Although former leaders continue to operate from abroad, often in India – despite extradition requests – the party’s legacy and network of grassroots support have suffered considerably. While support has not simply disappeared, many traditional supporters have become disillusioned: they still identify with the League’s historic role as the party of independence and longstanding governance but remain skeptical about its governance. Although the party and its activities are deliberately suppressed, the Awami League’s political identity and symbolic relevance continue to shape public opinion and voter behavior in the upcoming elections.
On the other hand, the BNP was the principal force against Hasina’s Awami League. Under Hasina’s 15-year-long rule, the BNP was suppressed and sidelined through systematic political repression, including illegal detentions and enforced disappearances of several BNP leaders, including high-profile figures like Tarique Rahman (son of Khalida Zia), which effectively marginalized the party from mainstream politics. The Zia family legacy – including Tarique and his daughter Zaima Rahman – evokes loyalty but also fuels public mistrust, particularly because of the governance challenges faced during their rule from 2001 to 2006. This period was marked by security instability, corruption at all levels, and nepotism and leadership disputes within the family, which led to feuds and factionalism, further weakening the leaders' ability to unite supporters and present a clear policy. These issues are even more pronounced now with Khalida Zia’s death, and should they persist, the party will find it difficult to gain broader appeal beyond its core base, limiting its success in the upcoming election.
The 2024 July unrest led to the creation of the National Citizen Party (NCP), a youth-centered political party promising political reforms and democratization in Bangladesh. The active student participants who led the NCP played a pivotal role in coordinating efforts to form the interim government but struggled to do so during electoral campaigns. Although populist rhetoric is popular with supporters, the trouble with nascent political parties is their lack of grassroots organization, underdeveloped vote bank, and limited political networks, which often hinder their ability to translate their rhetoric into tangible political influence. To address these weaknesses, the NCP sought to broaden its influence by entering into an electoral alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a party with a broad organizational base but a controversial legacy due to its opposition to Bangladesh's independence in 1971.
This coalition, while strategic in bolstering the NCP’s reach, has had significant repercussions for its identity. What began as a youth-driven, pro-democracy movement has become intertwined with Jamaat’s ideology, leading to disappointment and disillusionment among the NCP’s original supporters. Although the alliance allowed the NCP to secure 30 out of the 253 constituencies in a pre-election seat-sharing agreement, it also created significant internal friction. Key women leaders and other prominent members, uncomfortable with the ideological shift, resigned from the NCP and ran as independent candidates, highlighting the internal divide and raising questions about the party’s unity.
At the same time, public opinion polls indicate that the NCP’s electoral support remains marginal compared to the more established parties. A recent national survey found that just 2.6% of voters supported the NCP, compared to 70% for the BNP and 19% for Jamaat-e-Islami, revealing the NCP’s limited leverage in the upcoming elections. This fragmented political landscape, coupled with party splits and weak support for smaller factions, complicates the prospects for any one party to secure a clear majority. This will most likely result in a coalition government, further reducing the political stability necessary for sustained reforms to address the country’s political and economic challenges.
Apart from these political parties, the military has also held considerable power in the political sphere since 1971. Lately, it has been instrumental in keeping the semblance of political stability by manipulating governance in the background. However, it has also often weakened democracy in Bangladesh by overtly intervening in the political processes. Nonetheless, the military's overreach in politics provides it with considerable bargaining power in the post-election political landscape. Therefore, whichever party wins power will ultimately have to secure the military's support to retain it.
The Constitutional Referendum
After the July 2024 unrest, the July National Charter was created through dialogue among the interim government and numerous political parties. It outlines constitutional, electoral, and administrative reforms ostensibly to redistribute executive authority, strengthen checks and balances, and improve key state systems. Signed in October 2025 after extensive consultations, the Charter reflects a broad political consensus to reshape Bangladesh’s governance structure. On February 12th, voters will decide on these proposed reforms in a referendum held alongside the national elections. However, a single Yes/No option has compressed complex institutional preferences into a binary decision. Consequently, the mechanism risks misrepresenting diverse views rather than genuinely empowering citizens to shape specific reforms and could be manipulated as a political tool. In effect, the rhetoric of reform is strategically employed by the interim government and allied parties to secure political legitimacy and diffuse public frustration, rather than necessarily to address structural constraints such as entrenched corruption, a weak bureaucracy, or limited accountability in state institutions.
Historical patterns in Bangladesh show that constitutional provisions alone rarely alter power dynamics without credible mechanisms for enforcement, oversight, and institutional independence, conditions that remain weak due to longstanding governance deficiencies. Therefore, the promises of reform merely serve as political signals to pacify public demand for change without confronting the deep-rooted causes of instability, including economic vulnerabilities, demographic pressures, and institutional capture that have historically plagued Bangladesh.
South Asia at a Crossroads
Whoever takes the helm in Bangladesh will be tasked with navigating the country’s foreign policy, particularly with India, China, Myanmar, the U.S., and, of course, the rest of the world. Under Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh aligned with India on issues such as border security, counterterrorism, and economic cooperation. With Hasina gone, this relationship ended as well. And along with that, the ethnic tensions because of India’s anti-Muslim stance, and mistreatment of Bengalis, have complicated India- Bangladesh ties. The Muslim Bengalis legally living in India’s West Bengal and other north-eastern regions are derogatorily called Bangladeshis by the BJP Government, which keeps pushing them across the international border between India and Bangladesh, causing severe political and identity-based friction. This, combined with the deliberate changing of narrative regarding 'Bangali' and 'Bangladeshi' in India, has fueled ethnic and identity politics, deepening the divide. Furthermore, the mistreatment of Hindus in Bangladesh has escalated, partly due to their association with the Hasina regime, as many were supporters of the Awami League party. This rise in Islamist influence in mainstream politics has contributed to the growing vulnerability of the Hindu minority, as they are increasingly caught in the political crossfire.
BNP and JI have traditionally been anti-Indian in their approach, favoring China to counterbalance India. They have deployed the anti-Indian rhetoric to stoke fear and create political capital by portraying India as a hostile neighbor. This also seems to be the orientation of the NCP-JI coalition. Of course, addressing domestic and cross-border concerns will be both a priority and a challenge for the upcoming government amid widespread anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh. With India and China competing for regional hegemony, a rising anti-Indian sentiment is likely to push Bangladesh closer to China.
As interim leader, Muhammad Yunus oversees the electoral process; the resulting political vacuum is being filled by a mix of established and emerging political factions, complicating the canvas. Simultaneously, the election's outcome will also have significant implications for the geopolitical configuration of South Asia. Although the election is expected to determine the next government after a period of prolonged instability, it remains to be seen whether the next government can offer stability at home and abroad.
The Shifting Domestic Political Environment
On one hand is the Awami League – created by the Bangladesh’s ‘founding father’ Sheikh Mujib – which has been the dominant ruling party for decades; its historic roots in the liberation movement from Pakistan accorded it with widespread support. Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Sheikh Mujib) served multiple terms as prime minister and was the longest‑serving leader in Bangladesh’s history. However, in July 2024, social unrest erupted against Hasina’s rule, marked by a poor human rights record, bleak economic outlook, suppression of political dissent, and claims of rigged elections. Following Hasina’s ouster, the interim government banned the Awami League under the Anti‑Terrorism Act and suspended its electoral registration, effectively removing it from the February ballot. Thousands of its members and affiliated activists faced arrests, legal cases, and exile. Although former leaders continue to operate from abroad, often in India – despite extradition requests – the party’s legacy and network of grassroots support have suffered considerably. While support has not simply disappeared, many traditional supporters have become disillusioned: they still identify with the League’s historic role as the party of independence and longstanding governance but remain skeptical about its governance. Although the party and its activities are deliberately suppressed, the Awami League’s political identity and symbolic relevance continue to shape public opinion and voter behavior in the upcoming elections.
On the other hand, the BNP was the principal force against Hasina’s Awami League. Under Hasina’s 15-year-long rule, the BNP was suppressed and sidelined through systematic political repression, including illegal detentions and enforced disappearances of several BNP leaders, including high-profile figures like Tarique Rahman (son of Khalida Zia), which effectively marginalized the party from mainstream politics. The Zia family legacy – including Tarique and his daughter Zaima Rahman – evokes loyalty but also fuels public mistrust, particularly because of the governance challenges faced during their rule from 2001 to 2006. This period was marked by security instability, corruption at all levels, and nepotism and leadership disputes within the family, which led to feuds and factionalism, further weakening the leaders' ability to unite supporters and present a clear policy. These issues are even more pronounced now with Khalida Zia’s death, and should they persist, the party will find it difficult to gain broader appeal beyond its core base, limiting its success in the upcoming election.
The 2024 July unrest led to the creation of the National Citizen Party (NCP), a youth-centered political party promising political reforms and democratization in Bangladesh. The active student participants who led the NCP played a pivotal role in coordinating efforts to form the interim government but struggled to do so during electoral campaigns. Although populist rhetoric is popular with supporters, the trouble with nascent political parties is their lack of grassroots organization, underdeveloped vote bank, and limited political networks, which often hinder their ability to translate their rhetoric into tangible political influence. To address these weaknesses, the NCP sought to broaden its influence by entering into an electoral alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), a party with a broad organizational base but a controversial legacy due to its opposition to Bangladesh's independence in 1971.
This coalition, while strategic in bolstering the NCP’s reach, has had significant repercussions for its identity. What began as a youth-driven, pro-democracy movement has become intertwined with Jamaat’s ideology, leading to disappointment and disillusionment among the NCP’s original supporters. Although the alliance allowed the NCP to secure 30 out of the 253 constituencies in a pre-election seat-sharing agreement, it also created significant internal friction. Key women leaders and other prominent members, uncomfortable with the ideological shift, resigned from the NCP and ran as independent candidates, highlighting the internal divide and raising questions about the party’s unity.
At the same time, public opinion polls indicate that the NCP’s electoral support remains marginal compared to the more established parties. A recent national survey found that just 2.6% of voters supported the NCP, compared to 70% for the BNP and 19% for Jamaat-e-Islami, revealing the NCP’s limited leverage in the upcoming elections. This fragmented political landscape, coupled with party splits and weak support for smaller factions, complicates the prospects for any one party to secure a clear majority. This will most likely result in a coalition government, further reducing the political stability necessary for sustained reforms to address the country’s political and economic challenges.
Apart from these political parties, the military has also held considerable power in the political sphere since 1971. Lately, it has been instrumental in keeping the semblance of political stability by manipulating governance in the background. However, it has also often weakened democracy in Bangladesh by overtly intervening in the political processes. Nonetheless, the military's overreach in politics provides it with considerable bargaining power in the post-election political landscape. Therefore, whichever party wins power will ultimately have to secure the military's support to retain it.
The Constitutional Referendum
After the July 2024 unrest, the July National Charter was created through dialogue among the interim government and numerous political parties. It outlines constitutional, electoral, and administrative reforms ostensibly to redistribute executive authority, strengthen checks and balances, and improve key state systems. Signed in October 2025 after extensive consultations, the Charter reflects a broad political consensus to reshape Bangladesh’s governance structure. On February 12th, voters will decide on these proposed reforms in a referendum held alongside the national elections. However, a single Yes/No option has compressed complex institutional preferences into a binary decision. Consequently, the mechanism risks misrepresenting diverse views rather than genuinely empowering citizens to shape specific reforms and could be manipulated as a political tool. In effect, the rhetoric of reform is strategically employed by the interim government and allied parties to secure political legitimacy and diffuse public frustration, rather than necessarily to address structural constraints such as entrenched corruption, a weak bureaucracy, or limited accountability in state institutions.
Historical patterns in Bangladesh show that constitutional provisions alone rarely alter power dynamics without credible mechanisms for enforcement, oversight, and institutional independence, conditions that remain weak due to longstanding governance deficiencies. Therefore, the promises of reform merely serve as political signals to pacify public demand for change without confronting the deep-rooted causes of instability, including economic vulnerabilities, demographic pressures, and institutional capture that have historically plagued Bangladesh.
South Asia at a Crossroads
Whoever takes the helm in Bangladesh will be tasked with navigating the country’s foreign policy, particularly with India, China, Myanmar, the U.S., and, of course, the rest of the world. Under Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Bangladesh aligned with India on issues such as border security, counterterrorism, and economic cooperation. With Hasina gone, this relationship ended as well. And along with that, the ethnic tensions because of India’s anti-Muslim stance, and mistreatment of Bengalis, have complicated India- Bangladesh ties. The Muslim Bengalis legally living in India’s West Bengal and other north-eastern regions are derogatorily called Bangladeshis by the BJP Government, which keeps pushing them across the international border between India and Bangladesh, causing severe political and identity-based friction. This, combined with the deliberate changing of narrative regarding 'Bangali' and 'Bangladeshi' in India, has fueled ethnic and identity politics, deepening the divide. Furthermore, the mistreatment of Hindus in Bangladesh has escalated, partly due to their association with the Hasina regime, as many were supporters of the Awami League party. This rise in Islamist influence in mainstream politics has contributed to the growing vulnerability of the Hindu minority, as they are increasingly caught in the political crossfire.
BNP and JI have traditionally been anti-Indian in their approach, favoring China to counterbalance India. They have deployed the anti-Indian rhetoric to stoke fear and create political capital by portraying India as a hostile neighbor. This also seems to be the orientation of the NCP-JI coalition. Of course, addressing domestic and cross-border concerns will be both a priority and a challenge for the upcoming government amid widespread anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh. With India and China competing for regional hegemony, a rising anti-Indian sentiment is likely to push Bangladesh closer to China.
Sources: Image A: Spykman Center; Image B: Global Order
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has initiated many infrastructure projects in Bangladesh, as part of a broader geopolitical strategy to establish economic and security dominance in the region. By building ports, facilities, and maritime routes in critical points across the region, China aims to assert greater control over trade and shipping routes and over regional states as well. This – labelled the “string of pearls strategy” – aims to control access to and influence over the Indian Ocean, and then project this power beyond the region. In doing so, China also circles and limits India within its territory, as India operates as a strategic regional rival to China, vying for regional influence and control. Bangladesh, because of its strategic access to the Bay of Bengal, is a critical point. The development of Bangladeshi ports of Chattogram and Mongla with Chinese support illustrates this geopolitical dynamic. While Chinese investments may boost Bangladesh’s infrastructure, the country must be wary of the debt traps and dependencies that have accompanied Chinese-backed projects elsewhere. As China’s influence over a state grows through economic benefits, the state risks losing its strategic autonomy and becoming mired in long-term economic strain.
China’s growing influence in Bangladesh contrasts with its economic ties to India. In 2024, India exported about USD 11.32 billion worth of goods to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh’s exports to India were about USD 2 billion, reflecting a substantial two‑way relationship with a persistent trade deficit for Bangladesh. Meanwhile, China’s exports to Bangladesh totaled about USD 22.88 billion in 2024, making it a significantly larger supplier than India. In terms of imports by Bangladesh as a whole, Chinese products accounted for around USD 10 billion in 2025, compared with about USD 6.3 billion from India in the same period. These figures show that while Bangladesh trades heavily with both regional neighbors, its imports from China far outpace those from India, and its exports to both China and India are much smaller than the imports it receives, creating large trade imbalances in both relationships. Therefore, while Bangladesh can benefit from Chinese investments, it remains highly dependent on India for its economic stability and regional security, and decoupling from India will neither be easy nor swift, and perhaps not even preferred. Bangladesh’s attempt to balance both powers has been complicated by India’s resistance to projects backed by China. For instance, Bangladesh had to shelve projects with China due to Indian objections, highlighting the complexities of decoupling from India.
Over the years, the US footprint in Bangladesh has only decreased. Under the Trump Administration, the US has recalibrated its National Strategy, explicitly stating its intent to retrench from global commitments and focus on the Western Hemisphere. Given the US's unreliable attitude towards its traditional allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada, it is unlikely that Dhaka will pursue a deeper alignment with Washington. Bangladesh was hit with 37% tariffs under President Trump’s new trade policy implemented last year. Although this was later reduced to 20% after lengthy negotiations, the tariffs particularly hurt the Bangladeshi garment industry, which accounts for nearly 80% of its exports, mainly to the US. Even now, trade barriers threaten to reduce Bangladesh's export revenue, with potential losses estimated at $1.25 billion, highlighting the economic pressure it faces as it seeks to diversify its foreign relations.
And of course, Bangladesh’s next Prime Minister will have to engage with Myanmar to address the Rohingya refugee crisis. As Myanmar cracks down on its Muslim population, the Rohingya Muslims flee to neighboring Bangladesh to avoid persecution. Bangladesh currently hosts nearly 1 million refugees, and the number is only expected to grow. Naturally, this has put considerable strain on the already weak Bangladeshi economy, creating a crisis of its own. As Bangladesh seeks reparations for the added burden from the international community, it is reportedly pushing the refugees back, increasing the vulnerability of the Rohingya Muslims. The upcoming incumbent government will unlikely be able to address the country's social and economic concerns without also seeking a solution to this domestic, regional, and even international crisis.
Pakistan, meanwhile, sees Bangladesh’s shift in alignment as an opportunity to gain ground in a region where it has been increasingly sidelined by India. Given Pakistan’s challenges in Afghanistan, it views the deteriorating Bangladesh-India ties as an opportunity to revitalize its relationship with Bangladesh’s Islamist factions, turning the country into a strategic partner in its rivalry with India. Pakistan’s influence in Bangladesh could increase, as Islamist political groups like Jamaat-e-Islami may find common cause with Pakistan. Recent political exchanges and diplomatic visits between Pakistan and Bangladesh signal this potential shift in alignment.
A New Political Thriller of Bangladesh
The leadership vacuum left by Hasina, the emergence of the NCP, and the constitutional referendum all contribute to a shift in Bangladesh's political landscape. To what extent this helps Bangladesh steer a different future remains to be seen. However, the outcome of the elections will influence the country’s foreign trajectory in the region, especially its relationship with India and China. Bangladesh is at the intersection, and whatever is decided on February 12th will have a long-term impact not only on the country but also on the geopolitical stability of South Asia in the coming years.
China’s growing influence in Bangladesh contrasts with its economic ties to India. In 2024, India exported about USD 11.32 billion worth of goods to Bangladesh, while Bangladesh’s exports to India were about USD 2 billion, reflecting a substantial two‑way relationship with a persistent trade deficit for Bangladesh. Meanwhile, China’s exports to Bangladesh totaled about USD 22.88 billion in 2024, making it a significantly larger supplier than India. In terms of imports by Bangladesh as a whole, Chinese products accounted for around USD 10 billion in 2025, compared with about USD 6.3 billion from India in the same period. These figures show that while Bangladesh trades heavily with both regional neighbors, its imports from China far outpace those from India, and its exports to both China and India are much smaller than the imports it receives, creating large trade imbalances in both relationships. Therefore, while Bangladesh can benefit from Chinese investments, it remains highly dependent on India for its economic stability and regional security, and decoupling from India will neither be easy nor swift, and perhaps not even preferred. Bangladesh’s attempt to balance both powers has been complicated by India’s resistance to projects backed by China. For instance, Bangladesh had to shelve projects with China due to Indian objections, highlighting the complexities of decoupling from India.
Over the years, the US footprint in Bangladesh has only decreased. Under the Trump Administration, the US has recalibrated its National Strategy, explicitly stating its intent to retrench from global commitments and focus on the Western Hemisphere. Given the US's unreliable attitude towards its traditional allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada, it is unlikely that Dhaka will pursue a deeper alignment with Washington. Bangladesh was hit with 37% tariffs under President Trump’s new trade policy implemented last year. Although this was later reduced to 20% after lengthy negotiations, the tariffs particularly hurt the Bangladeshi garment industry, which accounts for nearly 80% of its exports, mainly to the US. Even now, trade barriers threaten to reduce Bangladesh's export revenue, with potential losses estimated at $1.25 billion, highlighting the economic pressure it faces as it seeks to diversify its foreign relations.
And of course, Bangladesh’s next Prime Minister will have to engage with Myanmar to address the Rohingya refugee crisis. As Myanmar cracks down on its Muslim population, the Rohingya Muslims flee to neighboring Bangladesh to avoid persecution. Bangladesh currently hosts nearly 1 million refugees, and the number is only expected to grow. Naturally, this has put considerable strain on the already weak Bangladeshi economy, creating a crisis of its own. As Bangladesh seeks reparations for the added burden from the international community, it is reportedly pushing the refugees back, increasing the vulnerability of the Rohingya Muslims. The upcoming incumbent government will unlikely be able to address the country's social and economic concerns without also seeking a solution to this domestic, regional, and even international crisis.
Pakistan, meanwhile, sees Bangladesh’s shift in alignment as an opportunity to gain ground in a region where it has been increasingly sidelined by India. Given Pakistan’s challenges in Afghanistan, it views the deteriorating Bangladesh-India ties as an opportunity to revitalize its relationship with Bangladesh’s Islamist factions, turning the country into a strategic partner in its rivalry with India. Pakistan’s influence in Bangladesh could increase, as Islamist political groups like Jamaat-e-Islami may find common cause with Pakistan. Recent political exchanges and diplomatic visits between Pakistan and Bangladesh signal this potential shift in alignment.
A New Political Thriller of Bangladesh
The leadership vacuum left by Hasina, the emergence of the NCP, and the constitutional referendum all contribute to a shift in Bangladesh's political landscape. To what extent this helps Bangladesh steer a different future remains to be seen. However, the outcome of the elections will influence the country’s foreign trajectory in the region, especially its relationship with India and China. Bangladesh is at the intersection, and whatever is decided on February 12th will have a long-term impact not only on the country but also on the geopolitical stability of South Asia in the coming years.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.