Some argue that Trump risks alienating at least part of his “MAGA” base, which not only opposes any foreign military intervention (though internal ones, like in Los Angeles, are much to its liking), but to any action abroad, even if merely diplomatic or, worse, humanitarian. The potential backlash from his core supporters is certainly something Trump has considered, because in his calculations the interest of the United States does not matter—only his own. What’s vital for the United States doesn’t count; what matters is what enhances or harms his own image. And in those calculations, it is unlikely that a group of individuals essentially devoted to idolizing him and accepting all his decisions—however incomprehensible—would be a real concern. Trump’s ways are infinite and all inscrutable.

Comments on Donald Trump’s inconsistency are also of little weight. He was elected on the promise of keeping the United States out of war, yet he has gone on to threaten military action (against Canada, Denmark, Panama, and Mexico) and to carry it out (against Yemen, and now Iran). These comments matter little for three reasons: 1) Trump changes his mind daily, even hourly—expecting consistency from him is like asking the Earth to stop spinning; 2) as Jacques Chirac once said, “Electoral promises only bind those who believe in them”; and 3) such political flip-flopping has happened before, and on a far larger scale: in 1916, Woodrow Wilson—who coined the slogan “America First”—was elected on the promise of keeping the U.S. out of Europe’s war, only to declare war on Germany a month after taking office. That did not prevent Americans, until then fiercely and almost unanimously isolationist, from enthusiastically supporting the intervention. Similarly, Franklin Roosevelt, re-elected at the end of 1940 with the same promise, took the country to war by the end of 1941.
Of course, the comparison doesn’t quite hold. In 1916, the United States was an emerging, dynamic, strong, and optimistic power. Today’s America is a declining, disoriented, and divided power—in essence, gripped by panic.

Where might opposition come from? Even excluding the MAGA base, there is a widespread aversion within the United States to new military adventures, especially since recent ones have not turned out terribly well. However, public opinion will depend entirely on how events unfold now: potential Iranian attacks or attacks by Iran’s hitmen on American soldiers, outposts, or even cities could completely reverse this sentiment.

Serious opposition from the Democrats is unlikely—they are even more disoriented and divided than the Republicans. Certainly, no opposition will come from the Republicans themselves, since within the party—if it can even be called a party—there are deeply rooted factions that have dreamed of destroying Iran since 1979, but not because they despise the ayatollahs or fear nuclear proliferation.

The United States has dealt with almost every dictator in the world, including some the Americans brought to power (like in Iran in 1953). They did so under Barack Obama, and they’re doing so now—more openly and enthusiastically than ever. They don’t oppose the ayatollahs as such: after the ayatollah Khomeini came to power, Washington made every effort to reach an agreement with the new Tehran regime, even denying the exiled shah (whom they themselves had reinstated in 1953 and protected lovingly until late 1978) entry into the U.S. for cancer treatment. What broke relations then was the embassy hostage crisis—a move by Khomeini’s organized mob (the infamous pasdaran) designed precisely to prevent any deal with Washington. That humiliation remains an open wound in the nationalist American psyche—an insult that must be avenged.

And finally, the nuclear issue is just a pretext. The U.S. is not against proliferation in principle—only against the proliferation by those they cannot control. It allowed the U.K. to obtain the bomb (albeit under supervision) but tried to prevent it for the French; it didn’t intervene against Israel’s nuclear program, but opposed India’s. Ironically, in 1976, to counterbalance potential Indian nuclear power (at the time backed by Moscow), the Ford administration helped… Iran acquire full nuclear cycle capabilities.

Despite the hawks’ thirst for revenge—both Republican and Democrat—the U.S. had not, until now, intervened in Iran. Why now? Because, as said earlier, the U.S. is weaker than at any point in modern history. Whatever the consequences—which we cannot yet foresee—this American intervention was decided not in Washington, but in Jerusalem. Netanyahu—effectively, in this instance, the real President of the United States—called it a “historic decision”. Perhaps it is; but if it is, the mark it leaves on history will almost certainly be a negative one—a step closer to a broader, disastrous conflict.

That doesn’t mean that it will end that way. Maybe Iran won’t hold up. But even in that case, few seem to be considering the consequences of regime collapse in Tehran. What’s certain is that if Iran disappears from the Middle East geopolitical balance, that balance will collapse. The U.S. entered World War I precisely to prevent the collapse of the European balance of power—the opposite of what the Americans are doing now. The present risk is that eliminating a key player from the Middle East chessboard could trigger a frantic, chaotic, and undoubtedly violent scramble among the others, regional and otherwise. Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum. If there was even a sliver of stability and equilibrium left in the Middle East—one of the least stable regions in the world—that fragile balance now risks being completely swept away.

One final thought: as we list the reasons behind our concerns, it’s almost certain that, today, in Moscow and Beijing they are popping Champagne.