EUrope’s Unfulfilled Promises:
North Macedonia and the Western Balkans’ Struggle with Identity and Integration
EUrope’s Unfulfilled Promises:
North Macedonia and the Western Balkans’ Struggle with Identity and Integration
The European Union’s approach to enlargement is increasingly seen as fragmented and reactive, undermined by internal divisions and external pressures. The clearest example is the Western Balkans, where nationalist tensions, economic instability and unresolved disputes challenge both the region’s progress and the EU’s credibility as a unifying force. The most recent development came on 15th October, when Albania officially began EU accession talks, marking a symbolic “decoupling” from North Macedonia. Despite significant reforms, North Macedonia continues to face persistent roadblocks on its path to European integration.
This decoupling highlights a troubling pattern of stagnation in the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans. While other countries in the region—such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro—grapple with political paralysis, corruption, or weak institutions, North Macedonia’s situation is particularly illustrative. Nationalist tensions are on the rise, inflation is severely impacting the quality of life and bilateral disputes, particularly with Bulgaria, remain unresolved. Just seven years ago, the outlook was starkly different. A pro-European government had come to power, relations with Greece and Bulgaria seemed to be improving, and reforms necessary for EU integration appeared within reach. The country even joined NATO in 2020, signaling progress toward Western institutions. However, its EU aspirations have been repeatedly thwarted by vetoes from Bulgaria and France, leaving the country—and the region—in limbo.
Twenty-one years after the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, which affirmed the European Union’s commitment to regional integration, why does the region’s geopolitical orientation remain so uncertain?
This decoupling highlights a troubling pattern of stagnation in the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans. While other countries in the region—such as Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro—grapple with political paralysis, corruption, or weak institutions, North Macedonia’s situation is particularly illustrative. Nationalist tensions are on the rise, inflation is severely impacting the quality of life and bilateral disputes, particularly with Bulgaria, remain unresolved. Just seven years ago, the outlook was starkly different. A pro-European government had come to power, relations with Greece and Bulgaria seemed to be improving, and reforms necessary for EU integration appeared within reach. The country even joined NATO in 2020, signaling progress toward Western institutions. However, its EU aspirations have been repeatedly thwarted by vetoes from Bulgaria and France, leaving the country—and the region—in limbo.
Twenty-one years after the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, which affirmed the European Union’s commitment to regional integration, why does the region’s geopolitical orientation remain so uncertain?
Political Entities in B&H Via Wikimedia Commons
A Geopolitical Crossroads
Before answering this question, a more fundamental one must be asked: Why are the Western Balkans a priority? The Russian invasion of Ukraine has intensified competition among the EU, Russia, China, Turkey and the United States for influence in the region. The ever-shifting geopolitical landscape of the region makes ensuring regional security and advancing economic development paramount for the EU.
Russia works to undermine the region’s integration into Western institutions by exploiting ethnic and religious divisions, fostering nationalist sentiments and embedding itself in critical economic sectors of the Balkan states. For example,
Russia exploits its relationship with Serbia to perpetuate tensions. Serbia effectively serves as a Russian pawn in the region because of its historical ties to Moscow and closeness to authoritarian figures like Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. In exchange, Russia supports Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence. To further fracture regional cooperation, Russia also backs separatist movements such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska.
Before answering this question, a more fundamental one must be asked: Why are the Western Balkans a priority? The Russian invasion of Ukraine has intensified competition among the EU, Russia, China, Turkey and the United States for influence in the region. The ever-shifting geopolitical landscape of the region makes ensuring regional security and advancing economic development paramount for the EU.
Russia works to undermine the region’s integration into Western institutions by exploiting ethnic and religious divisions, fostering nationalist sentiments and embedding itself in critical economic sectors of the Balkan states. For example,
Russia exploits its relationship with Serbia to perpetuate tensions. Serbia effectively serves as a Russian pawn in the region because of its historical ties to Moscow and closeness to authoritarian figures like Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. In exchange, Russia supports Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence. To further fracture regional cooperation, Russia also backs separatist movements such as those in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska.
Both China and Turkey also seek to expand their influence in the Western Balkans. China has secured economic influence via major infrastructure investments in countries such as Serbia, Montenegro and North Macedonia under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, these investments have resulted in economic dependencies and conflict with EU governance and environmental standards. Turkey, on the other hand, uses their shared culture and religious affinity to strengthen ties with Balkan Muslim communities to reassert its historical role as a regional power. These efforts contradict EU priorities, particularly on issues such as human rights, complicating the region’s alignment with the Union’s norms.
Despite being a close ally of the EU, the United States prioritizes its own strategic interests, to counter the growing Russian and Chinese influence. In doing so, it achieves another goal: highlighting the EU’s limitations in stabilizing the Western Balkans allows the U.S. to assert the indispensable role of the American alliance for the EU.
U.S. policies in the region, as seen in its mediation between Serbia and Kosovo, often focus on immediate stability over the EU’s longer-term reform agenda, emphasizing the EU’s struggles to effectively manage its own neighborhood. This dissonance sends mixed signals to Western Balkan nations, which may explore alternative alignments instead of adhering to the EU’s rigorous accession requirements, positioning the U.S. as a major arbiter in European affairs.
Despite being a close ally of the EU, the United States prioritizes its own strategic interests, to counter the growing Russian and Chinese influence. In doing so, it achieves another goal: highlighting the EU’s limitations in stabilizing the Western Balkans allows the U.S. to assert the indispensable role of the American alliance for the EU.
U.S. policies in the region, as seen in its mediation between Serbia and Kosovo, often focus on immediate stability over the EU’s longer-term reform agenda, emphasizing the EU’s struggles to effectively manage its own neighborhood. This dissonance sends mixed signals to Western Balkan nations, which may explore alternative alignments instead of adhering to the EU’s rigorous accession requirements, positioning the U.S. as a major arbiter in European affairs.
For the European Union, achieving integration stands as a critical test of its ability to navigate this complex geopolitical environment, balance competing interests and resolving longstanding tensions. One way the EU seeks to achieve this is by engaging in the region’s untapped market and development potential. Small economies in the region could contribute to the EU market and provide opportunities for investment, trade and labor mobility, while also shielding it against third actors currently vying for influence in the region. Recognizing this, the EU has prioritized connectivity projects, energy security and infrastructural development to integrate the Western Balkans into the broader European economy. While it is a long and often arduous process, full integration brings the promise of much-needed stability for the EU and the prospect of significant development opportunities for the emerging economies in the region.
Dalègre, Joëlle (2002), Grecs et Ottomans - 1453-1923, de la chute de Constantinople à la disparition de l’Empire ottoman (in French), L’Harmattan, ISBN 2-7475-2162-1
The Case of North Macedonia
North Macedonia’s path towards EU accession perfectly illustrates the broader challenges the Western Balkans are facing, particularly how nationalism, which stems from a historical struggle over identity and sovereignty, hinders the enlargement process. North Macedonia both gained independence and inherited territorial disputes with its neighboring states after the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. But the cultural and territorial tensions date to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) when the region of Macedonia was contested among Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, each seeking to incorporate parts of it according to their strategic, territorial and political interests. Each of these countries viewed the land as integral to their own national ambitions, often citing geographic proximity and historical governance as the basis for their claims. Throughout this period, the nascent Macedonian national identity developed, resisting these external claims and affirming the right to self-determination, with the enduring legacy of competing territorial and cultural claims still affecting the Macedonian society and politics today. As such, these nationalist sentiments serve as a major impediment to its EU accession process.
The recent Prespa Agreement of 2018 with Greece is a rare diplomatic success. The agreement resolved a decades-long dispute over North Macedonia’s name. It was made possible due to external pressure from NATO and the EU, combined with strong domestic political will, both an exception rather than the norm, across the region. More often, as shown by Bulgaria’s ongoing veto, nationalism drives political agendas, preventing meaningful solutions to bilateral conflicts. Bulgaria has demanded historical and identity concessions from North Macedonia before allowing EU negotiations, exhibiting a recurring pattern in the Western Balkans. These nationalist narratives at the domestic level outweigh regional cooperation and long-term strategic interests.
The Bulgaria-North Macedonia impasse thus reflects a broader challenge in the Western Balkans, where deeply entrenched identity politics not only obstruct bilateral relations, but also stifle the political will needed for regional cooperation and EU integration. Politicians frequently exploit these themes for short-term electoral gain, prioritizing immediate public support over sustainable progress, perpetuating deadlock and instability in the region.
North Macedonia’s path towards EU accession perfectly illustrates the broader challenges the Western Balkans are facing, particularly how nationalism, which stems from a historical struggle over identity and sovereignty, hinders the enlargement process. North Macedonia both gained independence and inherited territorial disputes with its neighboring states after the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. But the cultural and territorial tensions date to the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) when the region of Macedonia was contested among Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and the Ottoman Empire, each seeking to incorporate parts of it according to their strategic, territorial and political interests. Each of these countries viewed the land as integral to their own national ambitions, often citing geographic proximity and historical governance as the basis for their claims. Throughout this period, the nascent Macedonian national identity developed, resisting these external claims and affirming the right to self-determination, with the enduring legacy of competing territorial and cultural claims still affecting the Macedonian society and politics today. As such, these nationalist sentiments serve as a major impediment to its EU accession process.
The recent Prespa Agreement of 2018 with Greece is a rare diplomatic success. The agreement resolved a decades-long dispute over North Macedonia’s name. It was made possible due to external pressure from NATO and the EU, combined with strong domestic political will, both an exception rather than the norm, across the region. More often, as shown by Bulgaria’s ongoing veto, nationalism drives political agendas, preventing meaningful solutions to bilateral conflicts. Bulgaria has demanded historical and identity concessions from North Macedonia before allowing EU negotiations, exhibiting a recurring pattern in the Western Balkans. These nationalist narratives at the domestic level outweigh regional cooperation and long-term strategic interests.
The Bulgaria-North Macedonia impasse thus reflects a broader challenge in the Western Balkans, where deeply entrenched identity politics not only obstruct bilateral relations, but also stifle the political will needed for regional cooperation and EU integration. Politicians frequently exploit these themes for short-term electoral gain, prioritizing immediate public support over sustainable progress, perpetuating deadlock and instability in the region.
Photo Credits: Dimitris Vetsikas from Pixabay
Enlargement Dynamics
As demonstrated, inherent Balkan nationalism inhibits progress and further integration with the EU. However, slow progress cannot be solely attributed to this as, perhaps, the main challenge to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans seems to come from within the Union itself. The EU’s approach to enlargement is increasingly determined by its own internal constraints and external challenges, raising serious doubts about its credibility and feasibility.
At the core of the problem is the diverging priorities of the member states, resulting in the inability to sufficiently guide political developments in the region. Internal EU dynamics are decisively influencing its attitude towards enlargement, as public opinion in many member states appears increasingly wary. There is a prevailing fear that instability from the Western Balkans could affect the EU, especially given the Union’s limited ability to counter third-party influence in the region is leading it to take a more restrained approach, prioritizing stability and reforms over rapid integration.
The problem is magnified by the EU’s limited influence on nationalist disputes within candidate countries. While the EU can offer significant incentives, in the form of financial aid, political support and the promise of future membership, its soft power has proven inadequate to resolve such conflicts. Even though EU integration offers long-term benefits in terms of economic development, political stability and security, the concessions required to achieve these goals often come with high political costs for domestic actors, with the EU simply lacking the hard power to push through. The absence of coercive mechanisms to enforce reforms or resolve disputes leaves the EU incapable to deal with internal divisions, especially in deep-rooted conflicts like those between Serbia and Kosovo or within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Such rows between candidate states intertwine with the EU’s own internal skepticism about enlargement. Public opinion in many member states reflects an “enlargement fatigue”, originating from concerns about the burden on the Union’s institutions, the rollback of the rule of law in some of the more recent members such as Hungary and Poland and economic disparities with candidate countries. Moreover, some EU members are themselves increasingly ruled by nationalists and even sovereigntists, which further inhibits external action and internal cohesion.
This ties into the EU unanimity rule, which underscores its structural vulnerability. Any member state can exploit this rule to block candidate countries from joining due to bilateral disputes. Characteristic examples of this are the blockades of Greece and Bulgaria in the accession process of North Macedonia, as outlined earlier. In the Balkans, disputes are often fueled by a form of nationalism distinct from the civic kind, which emphasizes shared political values. Instead, the region's identity struggles are deeply rooted in ethnic, cultural and historical differences, often taking an exclusionary approach. This fosters unresolved tensions and competing claims that complicate regional relations and hinder the EU’s enlargement efforts. Local conflicts over national identity and historical differences thus escalate into broader pan-European challenges, perpetually delaying the region’s integration.
Such disputes amplify distrust within the Western Balkans, exacerbating the challenges imposed by the EU’s structural shortcomings, hence creating a feedback loop that undermines regional progress. Political leaders in countries like Serbia and North Macedonia face pressures from nationalist constituencies that oppose concessions perceived as compromises to national sovereignty or identity. In Serbia, specifically, President Aleksandar Vučić has been careful not to alienate hardline nationalist voters who oppose any recognition of Kosovo’s independence. While Vučić has engaged in dialogue with Kosovo under European mediation, significant concessions remain politically costly, and progress has been stagnant. This reluctance to engage in meaningful reforms, especially in areas such as rule of law and regional cooperation, slows alignment with EU standards and delays accession prospects.
Without effective tools to address nationalist sentiments, the EU’s credibility as a mediator in the Western Balkans is weakened, leading countries in the region to question whether EU membership is genuinely attainable. As the EU prioritizes internal issues, such as immigration, economic recovery and strengthening democratic governance, the strategic importance of Western Balkan integration is often sidelined. This shift in focus risks creating disillusionment among Western Balkan populations, who increasingly feel misled by what they perceive as a lack of true EU commitment to their accession. Ultimately, many in the region now view the enlargement process as influenced more by the internal politics of EU member states than by a fair, merit-based system.
As demonstrated, inherent Balkan nationalism inhibits progress and further integration with the EU. However, slow progress cannot be solely attributed to this as, perhaps, the main challenge to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans seems to come from within the Union itself. The EU’s approach to enlargement is increasingly determined by its own internal constraints and external challenges, raising serious doubts about its credibility and feasibility.
At the core of the problem is the diverging priorities of the member states, resulting in the inability to sufficiently guide political developments in the region. Internal EU dynamics are decisively influencing its attitude towards enlargement, as public opinion in many member states appears increasingly wary. There is a prevailing fear that instability from the Western Balkans could affect the EU, especially given the Union’s limited ability to counter third-party influence in the region is leading it to take a more restrained approach, prioritizing stability and reforms over rapid integration.
The problem is magnified by the EU’s limited influence on nationalist disputes within candidate countries. While the EU can offer significant incentives, in the form of financial aid, political support and the promise of future membership, its soft power has proven inadequate to resolve such conflicts. Even though EU integration offers long-term benefits in terms of economic development, political stability and security, the concessions required to achieve these goals often come with high political costs for domestic actors, with the EU simply lacking the hard power to push through. The absence of coercive mechanisms to enforce reforms or resolve disputes leaves the EU incapable to deal with internal divisions, especially in deep-rooted conflicts like those between Serbia and Kosovo or within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Such rows between candidate states intertwine with the EU’s own internal skepticism about enlargement. Public opinion in many member states reflects an “enlargement fatigue”, originating from concerns about the burden on the Union’s institutions, the rollback of the rule of law in some of the more recent members such as Hungary and Poland and economic disparities with candidate countries. Moreover, some EU members are themselves increasingly ruled by nationalists and even sovereigntists, which further inhibits external action and internal cohesion.
This ties into the EU unanimity rule, which underscores its structural vulnerability. Any member state can exploit this rule to block candidate countries from joining due to bilateral disputes. Characteristic examples of this are the blockades of Greece and Bulgaria in the accession process of North Macedonia, as outlined earlier. In the Balkans, disputes are often fueled by a form of nationalism distinct from the civic kind, which emphasizes shared political values. Instead, the region's identity struggles are deeply rooted in ethnic, cultural and historical differences, often taking an exclusionary approach. This fosters unresolved tensions and competing claims that complicate regional relations and hinder the EU’s enlargement efforts. Local conflicts over national identity and historical differences thus escalate into broader pan-European challenges, perpetually delaying the region’s integration.
Such disputes amplify distrust within the Western Balkans, exacerbating the challenges imposed by the EU’s structural shortcomings, hence creating a feedback loop that undermines regional progress. Political leaders in countries like Serbia and North Macedonia face pressures from nationalist constituencies that oppose concessions perceived as compromises to national sovereignty or identity. In Serbia, specifically, President Aleksandar Vučić has been careful not to alienate hardline nationalist voters who oppose any recognition of Kosovo’s independence. While Vučić has engaged in dialogue with Kosovo under European mediation, significant concessions remain politically costly, and progress has been stagnant. This reluctance to engage in meaningful reforms, especially in areas such as rule of law and regional cooperation, slows alignment with EU standards and delays accession prospects.
Without effective tools to address nationalist sentiments, the EU’s credibility as a mediator in the Western Balkans is weakened, leading countries in the region to question whether EU membership is genuinely attainable. As the EU prioritizes internal issues, such as immigration, economic recovery and strengthening democratic governance, the strategic importance of Western Balkan integration is often sidelined. This shift in focus risks creating disillusionment among Western Balkan populations, who increasingly feel misled by what they perceive as a lack of true EU commitment to their accession. Ultimately, many in the region now view the enlargement process as influenced more by the internal politics of EU member states than by a fair, merit-based system.
A Vicious Cycle
While enlargement remains an official policy of the EU, its practical implementation is increasingly being called into question. The EU’s institutional framework, distinguished by the need for unanimity, internal divisions and limited sway, creates significant barriers that slow down the process. The instability stemming from the delay in accession only empowers nationalist and populist trends, undermining the necessary reforms for EU integration. As made evident by the case of North Macedonia, despite diplomatic successes, nationalism-driven disputes reveal how short-sighted politics can create enduring obstacles.
Geopolitically, the area remains in limbo, as the EU’s inability to strengthen its influence opens the door for powers like Russia, China and Turkey to expand their presence. These countries offer alternative economic or political partnerships that undercut the alignment with the EU. Russia focuses on destabilization and bolstering nationalism, China deepens economic dependence through strategic investments, while Turkey enhances its influence by leveraging historical and cultural ties, especially among Muslim communities. The United States, working to counter Russian and Chinese influence through NATO, often end up playing a destabilizing part, further complicating the fragile geopolitical balance.
The synergy of these external influences, internal EU shortcomings and pervasive nationalism ensnares the Western Balkans in a vicious circle. The EU’s structural issues lead to inconsistent policies and delays in enlargement, fostering a perception among Western Balkan countries that the EU is divided or unwilling to prioritize their accession. This perception diminishes the EU’s influence and reduces the urgency of reform. Nationalist leaders, sensing that the EU is hesitant, face less pressure to make difficult, unpopular reforms that align with EU standards. Instead, they pander to nationalist bases by opposing necessary concessions. Simultaneously, external powers, exploiting this discord, increase their involvement in the region highlighting alternatives to integration with the EU and supporting policies that counter its goals.
Breaking this cycle is imperative if the Western Balkans are to move beyond prolonged stagnation and integrate fully into the European sphere. Without decisive action, the EU risks losing its strategic foothold in the region, leaving the Western Balkans to drift further from European values and into competing geopolitical alignments.
While enlargement remains an official policy of the EU, its practical implementation is increasingly being called into question. The EU’s institutional framework, distinguished by the need for unanimity, internal divisions and limited sway, creates significant barriers that slow down the process. The instability stemming from the delay in accession only empowers nationalist and populist trends, undermining the necessary reforms for EU integration. As made evident by the case of North Macedonia, despite diplomatic successes, nationalism-driven disputes reveal how short-sighted politics can create enduring obstacles.
Geopolitically, the area remains in limbo, as the EU’s inability to strengthen its influence opens the door for powers like Russia, China and Turkey to expand their presence. These countries offer alternative economic or political partnerships that undercut the alignment with the EU. Russia focuses on destabilization and bolstering nationalism, China deepens economic dependence through strategic investments, while Turkey enhances its influence by leveraging historical and cultural ties, especially among Muslim communities. The United States, working to counter Russian and Chinese influence through NATO, often end up playing a destabilizing part, further complicating the fragile geopolitical balance.
The synergy of these external influences, internal EU shortcomings and pervasive nationalism ensnares the Western Balkans in a vicious circle. The EU’s structural issues lead to inconsistent policies and delays in enlargement, fostering a perception among Western Balkan countries that the EU is divided or unwilling to prioritize their accession. This perception diminishes the EU’s influence and reduces the urgency of reform. Nationalist leaders, sensing that the EU is hesitant, face less pressure to make difficult, unpopular reforms that align with EU standards. Instead, they pander to nationalist bases by opposing necessary concessions. Simultaneously, external powers, exploiting this discord, increase their involvement in the region highlighting alternatives to integration with the EU and supporting policies that counter its goals.
Breaking this cycle is imperative if the Western Balkans are to move beyond prolonged stagnation and integrate fully into the European sphere. Without decisive action, the EU risks losing its strategic foothold in the region, leaving the Western Balkans to drift further from European values and into competing geopolitical alignments.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the authors alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.