by Massimiliano Pedoja
Is Taiwan Part of China?
Source: /r/mapmaking©
Picture yourself on the coast of China's Fujian province. The sun is shining, the sea lies calm and shimmering, and a fresh breeze sweeps across a clear blue sky. You decide to rent a boat and set sail eastwards into the vastness of the Taiwan Strait. As you glide through the waters, you may pass close to the Kinmen Islands (Quemoy), a small but strategically significant archipelago that lies just off the coast of mainland China. Unlike many remote islands, Kinmen is inhabited, with a population of 127,723 as of March 2020. Matsu and the Pescadores (or Penghu) also blend historical background (such as Song Dynasty garrisons on the Pescadores), remnants of past military tensions, and the rhythm of modern life. Further ahead, the horizon begins to shift, revealing the faint silhouette of a mountain range: Taiwan. Most likely, you are glimpsing the peaks of Chatianshan Nature Reserve. At its narrowest, the Taiwan Strait, which divides mainland China and Taiwan, measures approximately 80 miles (130 kilometres).

Given its proximity to the mainland, it would be easy to argue that Taiwan is part of China. However, this conclusion would oversimplify a question which is as complicated as it is controversial. To give a sense of the complexity, one might observe that there are two different passports issued by countries claiming the name “China”: one by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the other by the Republic of China (ROC). Notably, the ROC passport also includes “Taiwan” on its cover.
The PRC was founded by Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong in 1949 and has claimed Taiwan ever since. To the PRC, Taiwan is seen as a breakaway province that must be reunited with the mainland. President Xi Jinping, who in his 2023 New Year’s Eve address stated that Taiwan and China will “surely be reunified,” views reunification as a key part of the “rejuvenation” process to restore China to a position of global prominence, strength, and prosperity. As a matter of fact, Taiwan has never been a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established in 1949.
Source: /r/mapmaking©
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Qing Empire
The Qing Empire controlled Taiwan since 1683 when the Kangxi Emperor defeated the Kingdom of Tungning, founded by Koxinga, a pirate and Ming loyalist who had expelled the Dutch and ruled the island independently. The Dutch had first settled on Taiwan in 1624, establishing a trading post and fort at present-day Tainan, known as Fort Zeelandia, which they used as a base for commerce and regional influence. The island had previously been sighted by Portuguese sailors in 1544, who named it 'Ilha Formosa' (Beautiful Island) due to its lush landscapes. Although short, the Dutch presence on the island was historically significant as it attracted Chinese settlers – the Hoklo from Fujian and the Hakka (another Chinese ethnic group) – who smuggled their way to Taiwan, lured by the prospect of trading with Europeans. Before that, the island had been inhabited exclusively by Austronesians – an ethnic group spread across the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and New Zealand – who first settled in Taiwan 5,000 years ago, with their descendants still present today.

The Chinese had little strategic interest in Taiwan, viewing it as a remote no man’s land inhabited by savages, smugglers, and pirates. Their primary historical threats came from land, such as Mongol invasions from the north, shaping China’s defensive posture—hence the construction of the Great Wall. However, during the reign of the Yongle Emperor in the early Ming dynasty, China briefly embraced maritime expansion. Between 1402 and 1421, Yongle launched six grand naval expeditions under Admiral Zheng He, commissioning what were likely the largest wooden ships ever built. These fleets travelled to Indian ports, Hormuz, Jeddah, and as far as the African coast at Malindi, showcasing Chinese power and bringing prestige to Yongle, whose rule began as that of a usurper.

Despite their scale and ambition, the expeditions ceased shortly after Yongle’s death in 1424, likely due to their immense cost and diminished political purpose under subsequent emperors. This marked the end of the Ming dynasty's maritime expansion. By 1449, China faced renewed threats from northern tribes such as the Oirat Mongols, whose leader Esen captured the emperor Zhengtong in a devastating defeat near Tumu. As a result, the Ming dynasty shifted decisively to a defensive posture, abandoning its oceanographic dominance, which was soon surpassed by the Portuguese. With limited focus on maritime security, Taiwan’s strategic role remained minimal until Qing control, when it became an imperial province in 1887, largely ignored except for occasional rebellions.
Japanese Rule
Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which concluded the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War, the defeated Qing Empire ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. When the ROC was established in 1912, Taiwan had already been a Japanese colony for seventeen years. The Japanese initiated a process of colonization and cultural assimilation in Taiwan, improving the living conditions of the local population, creating an indigenous colonial elite, and establishing local assemblies.

The war between China and Japan, which began in July 1937, soon became intertwined with the broader conflict of World War II. During this period, the Japanese mobilized Taiwanese to support their war efforts. Between 1937 and 1945, approximately 207,000 Taiwanese were employed in the Japanese military, mostly in non-combatant roles such as logistical support and agricultural work in occupied territories. Although relatively few were deployed to front-line combat, wartime conditions led to over 30,000 Taiwanese casualties.

During the Cairo Conference (1943), ROC’s leader Chiang Kai-shek was assured by the United States and United Kingdom that territories seized by Japan, including the Lushun and Dalian leases, Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores, would be returned to the control of the Republic of China after the conflict.

In 1945, Taiwan was occupied by Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) on behalf of the Allied Forces. That same year, the Allies – the ROC, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union – issued the Potsdam Proclamation, reaffirming the terms of the Cairo Declaration. Japan’s unconditional surrender on September 2, 1945, confirmed its acceptance of these terms.

Under the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951–1952), Japan formally renounced its claim to Taiwan. The 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty then nullified the Treaty of Shimonoseki, reaffirming Taiwan’s transfer to the Republic of China (ROC). At the time, the ROC was still recognized internationally as the legitimate government of all China, a status it retained until 1971, when the United Nations and many Western nations shifted recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The Chinese Civil War
In 1949, after Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by Mao Zedong in the Chinese Civil War, around 1.5 million people, known as waishengren or ‘mainlanders’, fled to Taiwan and established a repressive harsh dictatorship over the local population. The imposition of Mandarin as the official language deepened local resentment, portraying Chiang Kai-shek’s mainlanders as a new occupying force after the Japanese. This linguistic dominance alienated the local population, who spoke Taiwanese Hokkien, Hakka, and indigenous languages, and reinforced the divide between waishengren and the local benshengren.

At the end of the Chinese Civil War, the Truman administration was hesitant to support Chiang Kai-shek and even contemplated leaving Taiwan to Beijing as part of a broader strategy to foster rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China, aimed at counterbalancing the Soviet Union. However, this inclination to reassess America’s posture toward the Chinese mainland was complicated by rising domestic anti-communist sentiment, which sought to “save” China from communism, and by the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950.

American Protégé
Eventually, the U.S. adopted a hostile stance toward the PRC by deploying the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, effectively deterring Mao from launching an invasion of Taiwan. This shift in U.S. posture, combined with the PRC’s intervention in the Korean conflict, further disrupted Beijing’s plans to attack the island, which had already proven challenging. In October 1949, a communist militia attempted to seize the island of Jinmen (also known as Quemoy), but they were unsuccessful. This failure demonstrated that an invasion of Taiwan would be an exceedingly challenging operation, and as a result, the issue was postponed.

Nevertheless, sporadic skirmishes between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) along the Taiwan Strait continued. Episodes such as artillery exchanges on the island of Jinmen (Quemoy) in the early 1950s underscored the ongoing tensions. Despite the unlikelihood of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, these confrontations only reinforced American resolve to support the island. Viewed as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” Taiwan became a crucial strategic asset in the U.S. efforts to contain Soviet influence in Asia.

For Mao and the Chinese Communist Party leadership, reclaiming Taiwan was far more than a military objective; it symbolized China's unwavering determination to complete its national unification and restore its historical status after the "Century of Humiliation" (1839–1949), a period marked by foreign invasions, internal strife, and the loss of vast territories and sovereignty. Taiwan was not merely seen as the last unresolved piece of China's territorial integrity but also as a powerful symbol of the nation's revival, embodying the aspiration to rectify historical injustices and reassert China's dignity and strength on the global stage. This vision became a cornerstone of Chinese nationalism, profoundly influencing its domestic and foreign policy for decades​.

The Seeds of Today’s Conundrum
For about three decades, until the 1970s, Taiwan and mainland China developed along separate political and economic paths. A major change happened in the early 1970s, when the Nixon administration shifted U.S. foreign policy toward China, seeking to normalize relations with the PRC. This shift was driven by strategic considerations during the Cold War, as the U.S. aimed to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and stabilize the region (particularly Southeast Asia).

In 1979, the Carter administration formally recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, aligning with the “One China” policy, which acknowledges that there is only one Chinese government. However, in April of that same year, the Taiwan Relations Act was enacted, allowing for commercial and cultural relations between the United States and Taiwan, and, crucially, committing Washington to provide military assistance to the island.

The policy of "strategic ambiguity" emerged during this time, aiming to balance engagement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and encouraging dialogue between the two sides, while supporting Taiwan's defence. Since then, the United States has maintained de facto relations with Taiwan, despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act states that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with defence assets and services necessary for self-defence. While the United States has consistently supported Taiwan’s defence, it does not explicitly guarantee military intervention should China attack, preserving a policy of strategic uncertainty. However, President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that the U.S. would defend Taiwan if China attacked, raising questions about whether this long-held policy is still in effect.

Although the PRC continued to assert its claims over Taiwan, the improvement in US-PRC relations and the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC’s new leader, enabled Taiwanese entrepreneurs to invest in China, thereby rekindling ties between the two sides of the strait.

TAIWANESE IDENTITY

Economic development
Following Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975, Taiwan gradually transitioned to a democratic country. Along with this political transformation, Taiwan experienced significant economic growth, earning its place as one of the 'Asian Tigers' (alongside Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong). Starting in the 1980s, Taiwan’s secondary sector underwent a major shift, transitioning towards high-tech and specialized industries. The island emerged as one of the world’s leading producers of computer-related goods, while also excelling in the electronics and chemical sectors. In the 1990s and 2000s, rising labour costs driven by improved living standards prompted many Taiwanese companies to relocate their production processes. Initially, these moved to Southeast Asia, but with the lifting of trade restrictions, mainland China became the primary destination for Taiwanese industrial investment.

Taiwan’s economy has demonstrated remarkable and sustained growth over time. During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, annual GDP growth rates averaged an impressive 9%. Even in the 1990s and early 2000s, growth remained robust. The country’s economic success is perhaps best illustrated by its per capita GDP, which soared from $170 in the early 1960s to over $41,000 by 2014.

The Democratisation Process
In 1975, Chiang Kai-shek passed away and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo became President of the Republic of China in 1978, serving until 1988. Aware of the urgent need for political reform, Chiang Ching-kuo initiated greater openness and understood that to ensure the Kuomintang's (KMT) legitimacy, democratic elections were necessary, transitioning the country away from its one-party rule. In 1987, martial law was lifted which marked the beginning of Taiwan’s democratization process.

President Lee Teng-hui continued Chiang Ching-kuo’s efforts to secure an electoral base for the KMT. In 1996, he won Taiwan’s first direct presidential election, but political competition with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) intensified, particularly amid rising ethnic tensions, as non-mainlanders demanded greater political representation. In fact, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – which was founded in 1986 - drew its support primarily from the benshengren, comprising the Hoklo, Hakka, and aboriginal populations.

As the DPP gained support and Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election, Taiwan’s national identity moved to the forefront of political discourse. There was an increasing effort to distinguish Taiwan from the People's Republic of China, not just in terms of geography but also through cultural and national identity. As a result, Beijing came to view the DPP as a pro-independence party.
Relations with China

Following Taiwan’s first free elections in 1996, the KMT gradually shifted its focus toward fostering cross-strait relations. This approach was driven by three key factors.
First, many KMT members and affiliated business groups, known as taishang, had substantial investments in China, creating strong incentives to maintain a cooperative reltionship with Beijing. Second, the KMT’s strategic positioning emphasised dialogue over confrontation, believing that engagement with Beijing could reduce cross-strait tensions and deliver economic benefits. Finally, historical ties influenced its stance. Rooted in Chinese nationalism, the KMT opposed Taiwanese independence, aligning with Beijing's goal of preventing secession. However, it advocated for maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing outright unification.

These ties made the KMT appear increasingly disconnected from the Taiwanese public, particularly the youth, who overwhelmingly identified as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, while its image as a proxy for Beijing drew criticism, especially as the PRC grew more assertive under Xi Jinping. This dynamic was particularly evident during Taiwan’s 2020 presidential election. The 2019 protests in Hong Kong, triggered by opposition to an extradition bill to mainland China, had a profound impact on public opinion in Taiwan. Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong demonstrators heightened fears among Taiwanese citizens about the potential erosion of their democratic freedoms if Taiwan were to unify with China under a "one country, two systems" framework.

These developments bolstered the re-election campaign of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who secured a decisive victory with 57% of the vote. Her platform emphasized safeguarding Taiwan’s sovereignty and rejecting Beijing’s unification proposals, drawing a direct contrast with the situation in Hong Kong. In contrast, the Kuomintang (KMT) suffered a significant defeat.
Thus, Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong indirectly influenced Taiwan’s elections, strengthening domestic support for the DPP, reinforcing the island’s distinct identity and its determination to preserve an independent democratic system and making the PRC’s efforts to foster reunification more difficult.
Today's Shifting Taiwanese Identity
Due to democratization, economic development and the recognition that reconquering the mainland was no longer achievable, Taiwan's identity began to evolve. This shift is reflected in surveys conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University between January and June each year, with the most recent data available as of June 2024. The first survey on Taiwanese identity (fig. 1) reveals that the percentage of people who identified as Chinese dropped from 25.5% in 1992 to 2.2% in 2024. Conversely, those who identified as Taiwanese surged from 17.6% to 64.3% over the same period, though 30.4% of the population still identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese.
A second survey (fig. 2), tracking attitudes toward independence and unification, showed a similar evolution. Support for unification declined, whereas more Taiwanese favoured eventual independence. However, the majority of the population still preferred to maintain the status quo.
The evolution of Taiwanese identity significantly influences how its people perceive themselves – either as part of China or as a distinct nation – and, therefore, shapes their relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). From Beijing’s perspective, this evolution poses a challenge to its goal of “peaceful reunification” and complicates any potential efforts to integrate the island, even through force if necessary.

TAIWAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
Taiwan also stands out as a critical point for security and stability in East Asia. Its strategic location makes it a key element of the first island chain, a series of islands stretching from the Japanese archipelago, through the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This "chain" is more than just a geographical formation: it acts as a vital maritime barrier for any naval operations in the region and beyond, serving as a natural and strategic limit that influences the movements of regional powers like China and the United States.

In this context, Taiwan plays an indispensable role in controlling access to the South China Sea and, more broadly, the Pacific Ocean. Its position makes it a decisive obstacle to the projection of maritime power in the region, affecting not only crucial trade routes but also the security dynamics between the major global powers.
This is further underscored by the presence of Chinese submarine bases on Hainan Island, which enhances Beijing's naval capabilities and nuclear deterrence.
Furthermore, Taiwan's strategic importance is deeply tied to its economic prowess, particularly in semiconductor manufacturing. As the home to major chip producers like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Taiwan plays a critical role in the global technology supply chain.

The island's dominance in this sector has given rise to the concept of the 'silicon shield,' which refers to the idea that Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor industry serves as a deterrent to potential military conflict. The global dependency on Taiwanese chips creates significant economic leverage, making any disruption to Taiwan’s production potentially catastrophic for many nations, including China. However, the 'silicon shield' is gradually weakening as China invests heavily in efforts to develop its own semiconductor production, while the U.S. and Europe increasingly localize semiconductor research, design, and manufacturing, thereby reducing their reliance on Taiwan.

In this scenario, Taiwan stands as the central node in a network of power and security that extends far beyond its political or historical identity. It has become key to controlling vital maritime routes – crucial for both regional and global balance of power – and the high end of the semiconductor supply chain, which is indispensable for technological innovation.

IS TAIWAN PART OF CHINA?
Whether Taiwan is part of China is, at its core, a political debate, shaped less by the will of the Taiwanese people and more by the broader power dynamics between at least the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. For Beijing, Taiwan's status is non-negotiable, embedded in its narrative of territorial integrity and the historical context of the Chinese Civil War. Taiwan is seen by the PRC not only as a breakaway province but also as a crucial element of its strategic security and global projection.

From the U.S. perspective, Taiwan functions as a strategic asset in the broader effort to contain China’s regional ambitions and maintain a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. While the U.S. officially adheres to the 'One-China Policy,' its strategic ambiguity, including arms sales to Taiwan, underscores its commitment to preventing any forced reunification by Beijing and ensuring that Taiwan remains a pivotal point of influence.

However, the identity of Taiwan is not the defining factor in this geopolitical struggle. Instead, it is a constraint on China’s actions and an element that serves U.S. strategies in countering China's rise. Taiwan’s status has become a point of leverage in the ongoing rivalry between these two great powers. The Taiwanese question, therefore, is not one of national identity or the aspirations of its people, but rather a question of power dynamics. Any formal declaration of independence by Taiwan remains the only scenario in which identity might truly be at stake, one that would undoubtedly provoke military action from Beijing.

This deadlock leaves Taiwan in a precarious position, often treated as a bargaining chip in Sino-American negotiations. There is no clear resolution to the Taiwan issue, as its outcome is fundamentally tied to the shifting balance of power and the competing interests of China and the United States.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.