Von der Leyen’s strategic agenda

Starting in February 2022, when Russian ground forces invaded Ukrainian territory, a new window of opportunity opened for the European Union. The return of war to the old continent awakened in many Member States a sense of urgency to overcome their defensive dependence on Washington through more substantial cooperation, especially given the uncertainty surrounding the future of American commitment. Ursula von der Leyen, known for her ‘European DNA,’ found herself at the helm in extraordinarily favourable waters, leveraging Russian expansionism as a catalyst to endow the EU with an apparent geopolitical dimension.

Russian foreign policy, steeped in a paranoia dating back at least eight centuries, remains inherently expansionist. However, having the instinct to expand does not equate to possessing the capability to do so. Currently, Moscow, fatally weakened by the conflict in Ukraine and improvidently responsible for NATO’s reinvigoration, is clearly incapable of conducting further military operations. A striking example of this inability to engage on multiple fronts is Moscow’s recent abandonment of Bashar al-Assad, a strategic ally of primary importance for the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the myth of the Russian threat remains a politically valuable tool for the Commission, as the perceived urgency should encourage alignment among actors.

In this context, von der Leyen seized the opportunity to attempt an emancipation of sorts, aiming to provide the Commission with an apparent geopolitical personality. She did so, among other things, by symbolically positioning herself as a leader in a new era of enlargement, a process that reflects the influence and appeal of the European Union. However, despite the rhetoric and the actual progress made in some accession procedures, the process remains fundamentally unchanged and interminable. The newfound momentum in opening official negotiations with candidate countries appears less a demonstration of concrete prospects and more a political gesture designed to support the narrative itself.

The European Union’s ability to appear credible in this role is directly proportional to the benefits it can derive. While often framed as a historical, cultural, or (worse) ethical issue, the EU’s interest in its neighbourhood lies in its role as a theatre of competition with the revisionist forces of Russia, China, and, to some extent, Turkey. Extending its model to the Western Balkans and the countries of the ‘Association Trio’ – Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – primarily serves to prevent these external destabilizing forces from intruding into the Union’s core and Eastern flank. For this reason, creating the illusion of capability is an important means to seduce aspiring members and deter rivals. Conversely, if the EU were perceived as incapable of pursuing its external objectives, its attractiveness – and, consequently, its very essence – would be undermined.

Abroad, The End of the European Dream?

While the Commission strives to convince the public of “great strides […] toward integrating new Members,” as its president puts it, the popular vote in the most ‘exposed’ states reveals the opposite and threatens to topple the house of cards. Where the spectre of Russification should, in theory, push public opinion further into Europe’s arms, the European cause appears to be losing ground. To deflect attention from these setbacks, as mentioned, European observers have labelled less favourable candidates as ‘pro-Russian’ and blamed Moscow’s interference for their growing popularity.

In Moldova, pro-European President Maia Sandu was re-elected (in the second round) and the pro-EU referendum was approved. However, it is also a fact that diaspora votes were once again decisive. The more than 180,000 favourable votes cast by Moldovans abroad were just enough to pass the referendum with a margin of about 10,000 ballots. Yet, the widely discussed divide between eastern and western Moldova has been largely overstated. The occupied territories of Transnistria did not vote differently from many other rural areas in northern Moldova, reflecting the widespread scepticism of the resident population, except within the capital.

At the same time, in Georgia, the overwhelming majority secured by the populists of Georgian Dream sparked criticism from European leaders. The elections’ legitimacy was contested, and mass protests were called for by the Georgian president, though the mobilization soon faded in the face of insufficient evidence. OSCE observers reported “high tensions” and an “uneven playing field” due to significant polarization and manipulation of the political debate. However, they also noted a “competitive and orderly” electoral process, symptomatic of a “growing democracy.” In contrast, Brussels delegitimized Georgian Dream’s victory by portraying a concerning authoritarian drift under a party allegedly “aligned with Moscow.” In doing so, it often overlooked the fact that the same party had already been in power during previous terms, including when Georgia submitted its EU membership application to the European Council.

Unlike pro-European idealists, Georgian Dream has often adopted a pragmatic (and demagogic) approach to balance tensions between Russia and ‘the West’, aiming to preserve internal stability, avoid economic crises, and “keep problems off Georgian soil.” The party refrained from joining the anti-Russian coalition and opening a second front but did not prevent the Georgian Legion from fighting alongside Ukrainian soldiers; it did not oppose the construction of the Russian naval base in Ochamchire, Abkhazia, but neither did it hinder NATO’s ongoing training operations on Georgian territory. Yet, the country – and the ruling party – that for years was considered a “bastion of freedom in Moscow’s backyard”, pragmatic and reformist, has suddenly slipped out of the European narrative’s dichotomy, and is now labelled a ‘pro-Russian’ force in Western media.

While Tbilisi’s shifting perspective on Brussels – evidenced by the suspension of its EU accession process – is undeniable, it cannot be attributed to Kremlin interference. Georgia has rejected reducing last October’s elections to a binary choice between Europe and Russia, opting instead for a path that preserves its national interests and cultural values. As noted, the Kremlin is currently a weaker and less influential centre of power than ever, with even its control over the occupied Abkhaz region increasingly unstable. Instead, it is Brussels’ ideological rigidity that alienates Tbilisi and enables Russia, despite its weakened state, to safeguard its interests in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.

Dogmatic, aging, and lacking credibility, the EU has become a passive observer of its shrinking external influence. Its declining appeal is further exacerbated by internal divisions: Hungary and Slovakia, for instance, promptly recognized the results of the Georgian elections, starkly opposing the European Parliament’s resolution. This impotence is reflected in the waning enthusiasm among candidate countries, which, driven by pragmatism, reject the Manichean narratives of a binary world. While many attribute this situation to Moscow – which would likely act in such a manner if it had the capability – the primary responsibility lies with the EU itself.

At Home, No One at the Helm

The stagnation of the enlargement process is a direct consequence of the existential crisis afflicting the European project as a whole, a result of the troubling sense of disorientation within its true leadership. The dyadic relationship between France and Germany – cavalier et cheval in the Gaullist vision of a united Europe – is at its lowest point since the Union’s inception and has rarely sunk to such depths since the Elysée Treaty of 1963. Weakened by internal dynamics and unable to find common ground, the two driving forces of European integration perceive the expansion of the EU’s borders as yet another challenge to their precarious centrality.

In Paris, even amid an unprecedented political crisis and at the twilight of its era as a great power, the ambition for a France-led Europe persists. This outdated ambition is rooted in General de Gaulle’s political legacy, from a time when France held considerable weight in a fragile Europe, with Germany still divided. As for Germany, it is caught in an identity crisis, on top of a political one, where conflicting tendencies create a tangled strategic cacophony. Torn between pro-Europeans, Atlanticists, pro-Russians, and nationalists, Germany is unable to chart a clear course. Whether Berlin will take the reins of Europe once more or choose a “return to history” within its national dimension will become clearer on February 23^rd.

France, moreover, is stuck in a state of political deadlock, with the Elysée backed into a corner by the dominant Euroscepticism of both the far-right and far-left, marked by traditional antigermanisme. Adding to this are more recent tensions, the latest being von der Leyen’s decision to sign the free trade agreement with the Mercosur countries, provoking outrage in France and Poland, primary beneficiaries of the Common Agricultural Policy. In the face of the crumbling Franco-German axis, delegitimizing voices from the East are rising, aiming to redefine the balance of power. Poland itself, which twenty years ago found its place within the sphere of German influence, is now championing a more Eastern-driven Europe, reopening historical wounds with Berlin that were never fully healed.

The systemic weakness of the EU stems from its entrapment in a dialectic between the Union’s general interest and the national interests of its Member States. This condition becomes all the more damaging as particular interests increasingly diverge and leadership grows more uncertain, directly undermining decision-making processes. The inability of the strongest players to lead with a shared vision capable of reconciling general and particular interests renders the EU a victim of its mechanisms and its own worst enemy. A paralyzed Union serves no one, and both European and non-European voters are taking notice.

Europe in Search of Itself

Von der Leyen embodies the final vestige of the now-defunct Franco-German tandem. German by nationality and political affiliation, francophone by birth, she has presided over the European executive since 2019 as a result of France’s (and Hungary’s) effort to bypass the spitzenkandidat system, which would otherwise have awarded the presidency to Manfred Weber. Now, her Commission is attempting to capitalize on the difficulties faced by national governments to reshape the contours of the aforementioned dialectic. It does so by beginning with enlargement, and leveraging the spectre of the Russian threat to position itself at the helm of a process that Member States seem increasingly unable to support.

However, enlargement remains firmly subordinated to the will of the Member States, which control its pace and scope. As with all essential matters, the Council decides unanimously, meaning the power ultimately rests with those capable of pulling the others along. If France and Germany fail to assume this leading role, they risk not only relegating enlargement to the quagmire of institutional mechanisms but also making it less appealing. A larger Europe, yet one at the mercy of events — where any member could obstruct the collective will of the other 26 (or more) without consequence — would ultimately be even more insubstantial on the international stage, undermining the very purpose of its expansion.

In the logic of many European idealists, the way forward lies in revising the Treaties. As von der Leyen herself stated, reforming the decision-making process is “long necessary, and now indispensable in light of potential enlargement.” However, the true obstacle is inherent rather than institutional. By its very nature, a sovereign state does not willingly surrender its sovereignty unless compelled by circumstances where all alternatives are less advantageous. There is no doubt that the EU is an unfinished project, facing the choice of taking a qualitative leap forward or succumbing to disintegration. Yet the necessary impetus could only come from an irresistible and indivisible unifying force, with France and Germany as the most plausible drivers.

One thing seems very likely: as long as particular interests prevail over the general interest, the borders of the EU will remain unchanged. More critically, if Paris and Berlin fail to rediscover a shared vision – which seems highly unlikely in the near future – not only the prospect of enlargement but the entire European project risks being doomed to failure.