President Trump claims that Venezuela is responsible for the illicit trade that brings drugs – mostly cocaine and fentanyl – to the US. As of 23^rd December, the US has struck 29 boats it claims were loaded with drugs, albeit without congressional approval and without presenting evidence. President Trump has also asserted that Venezuela “stole oil and land from the US” and has therefore imposed a “total and complete blockade” of oil tankers, seizing three tankers linked to Venezuela in international waters. In addition, Trump also mobilized the CIA for covert operations inside the country and deployed American warships in the Caribbean – the largest US naval deployment in the region since the Cuban Missile Crisis. What has likely caused this?

What this is not about
First, fentanyl is primarily produced in Mexico and enters the US through its southern border. Mexico is also the most significant source of US-bound methamphetamine and heroin, and a transit point for South American cocaine. Colombia, along with Peru and Bolivia, produces the bulk of cocaine destined for the US, typically through Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. Although cocaine and fentanyl production in Venezuela is negligible, the country does facilitate drug trafficking networks. As Trump takes extraordinary actions against Venezuela for its alleged involvement in the drug trade, he simultaneously pardoned the former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was serving a 45-year sentence in the US for trafficking nearly 400 tons of cocaine into the country. This is simply not about drugs. 

Second, this escalation is not primarily about oil either. The US is the largest oil producer in the world and Venezuelan crude only contributes a small and replaceable portion. For example, Venezuelan crude accounted for only 3.5% of total US crude imports in 2024. However, it constituted roughly 13% of the crude processed by US Gulf Coast oil refineries, which are particularly suited for Venezuela’s heavy crude. Even so, this does not amount to strategic dependence, as the US can readily source oil from Canada, Mexico, or Gulf states – as it did when it imposed sanctions on Venezuela from 2019-2023. 

While sanctions significantly reduced Venezuelan oil exports, they did not eliminate them entirely, not even to the US. Even amid the ongoing tensions, the U.S. imported  921,000 barrels per day (bpd) in November. More importantly, Venezuela remains attractive not because of immediate US energy needs, but because it holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves – approximately 303 billion barrels as of 2023. This is a significant strategic asset that Washington does not want to be controlled or owned by other states, especially China. 

Is this about China then?
China has undoubtedly expanded its economic footprint in Latin America in recent years, becoming a major trade partner for most of South American countries (according to CIA Factbook) – always surpassing the United States in trade volume. Nonetheless, according to SIPRI, the arms export in the region is still dominated by France (30%), United States (12%), UK (11%) at the moment. 

In Venezuela, however, the footprint is not as expansive. As of 2023, 50% of Venezuelan exports went to the US, compared with only 10% to China. Its imports from China accounted for 35%, compared with 24% from the US. But, China remains the biggest buyer of Venezuelan oil, accounting for nearly 4% of Chinese total oil imports, at an average of more than 600 kb/d in December 2025. 

However, trade is one thing, investments are another, and trade does not automatically translate into strategic control. Chinese foreign direct investments stood at only 2% in 2024, compared with 38% from the US. Investment patterns continue to favour Washington, preserving its strategic edge in the region. While Washington would undoubtedly seek to limit Chinese influence in its backyard and especially on Venezuelan oil, China’s presence in Venezuela has not reached the levels that would justify such an extreme response from the US.

Is this about Russia? 
The answer is both yes and no. Russia has long maintained military and economic ties with Venezuela since the regime of Hugo Chávez who embraced populist economic policies and renounced U.S. assertiveness in the region. For Moscow, extending aid to Venezuela was geopolitically valuable as it allowed a symbolic foothold in America’s backyard. However, it yielded limited tangible benefits to either side. According to The Washington Post, much of the military equipment supplied to Chavez was ‘nonoperational or outdated’. Russian investments in Venezuelan oil sector helped Caracas endure US sanctions to some extent but generated minimal returns for Moscow. 

Presently, Russia is deeply preoccupied with the Ukraine War. It is grappling with burdens of a war economy, demographic decline, and its undesirable but necessary reliance on China. Putin’s visit to India in early December in hopes to diversify weapons exports and gain new markets for trade did not yield any positive result. Despite Maduro’s appeals, as with Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, and with Iran, the response from Russia will be limited. Thus, Russia is unlikely to expand its influence in the region or in Venezuela. Additionally, the new US Strategy has substantially shifted tone on Russia – from the traditional lens of viewing Russia as a threat – and is perhaps unwilling to assert any pressure on Russia anyway. However, the US would want Caracas to align firmly with Washington. 

Venezuela’s Structural Crisis
Oil discoveries in 1914 and rising global demand transformed an agrarian economy into the world’s largest oil exporter and second largest oil producer after the United States by the 1930s. Unfortunately, this economic boom preceded the development of strong political institutions. As a result, the surge in wealth was mishandled by the dictators.

For economic stability, diversified manufacturing and domestic production are essential to protect against external shocks and inflation. Instead, oil revenues – accounting for two-thirds of government income – were largely spent on imports of food and consumer goods, rather than on long-term investments. However, when investments were made, they were in the construction, retail, and import sectors, where money was lost to corruption, bribes and subsidies. Lowering of income taxes further undermined sustainability as an important source of government revenue was foregone. The nationalisation of oil in the 1970s further increased government revenues, entrenching economic dependence on a single sector, without any safety net. When oil prices fell in the 1980s, the illusion of prosperity broke.

The resulting crisis paved way for Hugo Chávez’s rise in 1998. His populist (and suicidal) economic policies aimed at short term solutions for acute shortages and food crisis. He spent oil sales to import goods or enact social programs which offered subsidies and cash transfers. When that was not enough, he directed money reserved for investments in the oil business (the only source of Venezuelan livelihood), which resulted in long-term economic inefficiency. He nationalised industries, driving out private enterprises and expertise. When revenues fell, he depleted foreign exchange reserves. To finance spending after depleting foreign exchange reserves, the government resorted to monetary expansion, which weakened the currency against dollar (and other currencies), creating runaway inflation. As prices soared, he imposed price controls, which only created black markets for food and other essentials and gave rise to criminal activity. Resource rich countries often invest in sovereign wealth funds with surplus revenues for long-term investments; Chávez saved nothing, leaving Venezuela vulnerable to repeated oil shocks. 

Because he procured money to provide short-term economic relief, he was popular (as with all populist leaders) among Venezuelans. Not so much with Washington, though. In 2007, Chávez offered free heating oil to the poor in the US during winter months, further deteriorating ties between both countries. Back home, his policies (and of previous Venezuelan dictators) weakened the structural foundations of the country. When Chávez passed away in 2013, his protégé, Nicolás Maduro, took over. He continued with the same economic trajectory, consolidating power in hands of the few while curbing dissent with military forces. Antagonistic ties with the US also did not change.

Today, nearly 75% Venezuelans live in extreme poverty, inflation exceeds 270%, and the country is facing mass migration. Of roughly 7.9 million Venezuelans who have fled the country, 85% are spread across Latin American countries and less than 2% account for immigration to the US. 

Does Trump want to change the regime in Venezuela?
There is widespread speculation that CIA involvement and naval deployment signal an intent to remove Maduro. Yet regime change would neither resolve Venezuela’s systemic dysfunction nor eliminate America’s drug and migration problem. Historical precedents – from Iran, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, and Libya – demonstrate that externally imposed regime change only deepens instability.

Maduro has a strong opposition, including María Machado, – the Nobel Peace Prize winner for her advocacy for democracy in Venezuela – who has been barred from elections. Repression, arrests, and intimidation have crippled opposition mobilization. The military remains the most powerful institution, and any successor lacking its backing would be politically unsustainable. It is also likely that even if Maduro is removed, the military will install another incompetent replacement for the job. Despite opposition, Maduro enjoys support of at least one-third of the population due to Chávez’s enduring legacy. Forcible removal risks triggering violent responses from armed groups and criminal networks that have come to dominate Venezuela, destabilizing the fragile stability Maduro has managed with his authoritarian rule.

What is the U.S. trying to achieve then?
In a speech to the Congress in 1823, President James Monroe, declared the Western Hemisphere off-limits to European colonisation. It was not elevated to the status of ‘doctrine’ until 1865 when it was enforced. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the principle through the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’, asserting the US right to intervene in internal matters of the countries in the region to ‘restore’ internal stability and act as an ‘international police force’. This was to showcase the strength of the rising power with an appetite for a more active regional involvement. It became ground for interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Salvador, Panama, Chile you name it. 

Last month, President Donald Trump introduced what he termed “Trump Corollary” pledging to “enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere” by denying “non-Hemispheric competitors… to own or control strategically vital assets”, policing flow of migration and drugs, if necessary, by force. 
The problem is that the US of today is not the US of 1904. It is a rapidly declining power no longer in the position to take a greater share of responsibilities across different regions, establish rules and ensure that they are respected. Another indicator of this decline is that the conflicting voices within the White House reflect a lack of clear strategy. The simple answer to what the US is trying to achieve in Venezuela is that even folks in Washington do not know – or they are thinking different things. 

Depending on which voice we want to listen to, current US actions can be considered to exemplify Trump’s “escalate to negotiate” tactic. Perhaps removing Maduro is not the end goal, bullying him into submission is; as Trump did with South Africa, Ukraine, India, and even Europe. To divide the world into three spheres of influences among US, China and Russia, Trump would want to begin with ideologically aligned Venezuela (and the Western Hemisphere) with Washington. Not an unlikely scenario given speculations of creating a ‘Core-5’ consisting of US, China, Russia, India and Japan, as an alternative to the G5/G7. It may as well be to take a more hardline stance to remove Maduro, perhaps even with force. Trump’s renewed push to annex Greenlandby appointing a special envoy shows how some in the Administration are willing to bulldoze through norms and laws to achieve their interests – whatever they may be. Or it may simply be a signal to China to decouple from the region altogether – a wishful thinking rather than a policy.

None of these paths offer stability — neither for Venezuela, nor for the region, and certainly not for the international system. Nor does this showcase American strength, it only accentuates its decline. This will only embolden China to more freely pursue its interests.

One last note on the American decline: the US military strikes on boats carrying drugs to the US, has killed so far at least 105 alleged narco-terrorists, as of 23^rd December. President Trump sanctioned these strikes under Article 2 of the US Constitution (deeming President as the Commander in Chief) rather than through Congressional approval is under immense scrutiny both domestically and internationally. And now, the seizure of oil tankers in international waters is raising concerns about its legality as well. The US has been hypocritical in its actions in the past, but openly flouting the law both domestic and international – amid glaring absence of evidence to support its allegations – is further eroding American power, both at home and abroad.