The stubborn sympathy between Budapest and Moscow raises questions about whether Hungarians remember the events of 1848, when the Russian Army intervened on the behalf of the Austrian Empire to quell the Hungarian Revolution, and 1956, when the Soviet troops violently repressed Imre Nagy’s newborn government, resulted from October 23^rd protests against Hungarian subordination to the USSR. They certainly remember, but their government elites still perceive Russia as a leading power in the region, to whom they have to deal with. As Orbán said many times, being a nation surrounded by Slavic and German peoples, Hungary has to work diligently to ensure its country survives as a sovereign nation; to this end, they must maintain strong relationship with powers like Turkey, Germany and Russia, while maintaining a degree of independence from supranational political entities such as European Union and NATO. What stands behind this strategy is the idea that by cultivating good relations with these countries, Hungary can effectively balance its foreign policy and secure its economic and energy resources. This approach is believed to help Hungary to succeed in its constant commitment to preserve its sovereignty, both by avoiding over-reliance on any single power and by ensuring that its national interests are proficiently protected.

From a realistic perspective, given the current economic and political framework, this strategy might sound as a reasonable option. After the Ottoman invasion in 1526, the western part of Hungary fell under the Habsburg Empire, and in 1699 it became fully integrated as the Ottomans were expelled. Despite Hungarian nationalism grew in response to the Habsburg’s presence, the country still orbits in Germany’s sphere of influence. Nowadays, as a leading power in the EU, Germany’s influence on European policies is significant; through strong relations with Germany, Hungary can protect its interests within the EU framework, ensuring that its sovereignty is respected in negotiations and decision-making processes. Germany is also Hungary’s largest trading partner, allowing Hungary to be less dependent on aid or loans from other international institutions or countries – such as EU’s NextGeneration, EIB and EBRD development programs, and China – and maintain economic stability and independence, as they often come with conditions that can undermine national sovereignty. This allows Hungary to position itself as a more influent player within the EU, influencing its policies in ways that protect Hungarian sovereignty – such as resisting pressures for deeper political integration that might dilute national control.

At the same time, Hungary’s relationship with Russia offers the possibility to diversify its foreign policy and energy dependencies, reducing reliance on Western powers, such as the European Union and the United States. By engaging with Russia, Hungary can negotiate better terms for strategic imports, such as natural gas and other key resources, thus ensuring that external powers cannot easily exert pressure on Hungary through energy dependencies. Moreover, as it is well known, Hungary was part of the Soviet sphere of influence after World War II and became a satellite state under Soviet control. The period of Soviet domination left a lasting impact on Hungary’s political and economic systems, and its memories still determine how the country navigates its relationship with Russia.

In this context, Turkey’s role as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East provides Hungary with strategic leverage in its dealings with both regions. Turkey is a key player in the region and has significant influence over migration routes and regional security issues; good relations with Ankara can help Budapest manage migration pressures, which is a critical aspect of its sovereignty. This relationship can be particularly important in negotiations related to security and defense within NATO, where both Hungary and Turkey are members.

On the other hand, the history of criticism towards the German Empire is not as old as the hostility to the imperial Russia (then USSR), which suppressed two revolutions and forced Hungary twice into a state of limited sovereignty. This sentiment appears to be almost equally strong, given the deep-rooted nationalism that characterize Hungarians. Indeed, the issue is not whether to stand with one alliance or the other, but protecting against the risk of being drawn into a mechanism that could weaken national sovereignty. At the same time, when Viktor Orbán was re-elected in 2010, his government increasingly exhibited autocratic tendencies, establishing what even he defined as an illiberal democracy, showcasing constant attacks on the principles of separation of powers and, more generally, of rule of law. High level corruption – the country is ranked 76 on 180 with 42 points on a maximum of 100, where 0 means highly corrupted, one of the worst positions in the western area according to the 2023 version of CPI’s map - limits to press freedom and anti-liberal ideals are just some of the shared “values” with Moscow. In fact, while EU and the United States demand adherence to their values, partners like Russia (and China) tend not to interfere with domestic policy, representing quieter actors that closely suit certain Hungarian’s government attitudes. These reasons could already explain why Russia provides economic incentives, such as the construction of Paks Nuclear Power Plant and its current expansion – critical for sustaining Hungarian economy – and why Russian pipelines supply more than 85% (mostly through TurkStream) of Hungary’s gas demand, while China has just signed to finance a Budapest-Belgrade railway as part of Belt and Road Initiative. But, of course, there is more.

Indeed, the closeness with Hungary is important for Putin as it represents a chance to influence the European Union, trying to ease its pression on the war in Ukraine. Despite the historical mistrust nurtured for Russians, that led Orbán to play a key role in the anti-Soviet campaign back in the 1990s, the PM can count on the same, perhaps stronger, sentiment for Ukrainians. Relations between Budapest and Kyiv started to crumble when Ukraine introduced restrictions on national minorities, aiming to combat Russian influence. These policies limited the use of minority languages (including Hungarian) in education and public life, that Hungary saw as a threat to the cultural rights of ethnic Hungarians. In fact, Budapest sustains that minority communities in Transcarpathia, a region ceded to Ukraine SSR after World War II, faced hostility due to these policies. The Hungarian living in Transcarpathia still maintain strong cultural and political ties to Hungary, for instance by intending to avoid integration and remain a linguistic minority.

Now, the Government, that has prioritized their status in its foreign policy towards Ukraine, is underlining its concerns for these minorities by openly avoiding supporting the Western’s position on the War. It has actively promoted engagement with these minorities – for instance, by providing Hungarian passports – and has been accused of attempting to influence the outcome of 2019 elections in the region, while blocking Ukraine’s negotiations to join NATO. This means that Hungary’s relationship with Russia can be, at the same time, partly understood through the lens of the protection of minorities. The country’s position on issues like the annexation of Crimea reflects its broader concern for ethnic Hungarians abroad.
The relevant political efforts directed toward defending Hungarian minorities showcase how central this topic is to the national debate. The theme has deep historical roots, that go hundreds of years back when the Magyar people gave birth to Kingdom of Hungary in the 9^th century. Over the years, while their kingdom was split into different parts, Magyar maintained a strong sentiment of national identity and the desire for a self-ruled country. But when the Treaty of Trianon was signed in 1920, after World War One - giving Transylvania to Romania, southern Slovakia and Transcarpathia to Czechoslovakia (then Ukraine), and Vojvodina and Croatia to what will soon became Yugoslavia – it resulted in Hungary losing two-thirds of its territory and a significant portion of its population, including around three million of ethnic Hungarians who found themselves living in neighboring countries. This traumatic event created a strong sense of grievance and loss within Hungary, which continues to influence its national consciousness.

The defense of Hungarian minorities in these countries is seen as a moral and historical obligation by the government; protecting their rights, culture, and identity is a way to address the perceived injustices of Trianon and maintain a connection with these communities. Moreover, politicians in Hungary have used the defense of these minorities as a way to garner domestic support and reinforce nationalistic sentiments. This policy resonates strongly among the people, many of whom feel a deep connection to these communities, while the Hungarian government appeals to nationalist voters and reinforces its legitimacy as the protector of Hungarian identity and interests. This also helps to maintain a strong nation-centered narrative that contrasts with the more cosmopolitan and integrationist approach of the EU.
While these elements have clearly influenced current Hungarian government policy on military aid and sanctions, other historical and cultural factors have played their part as well. Although Hungary has moved away from its past as a soviet satellite, there is a legacy of shared political history between the two nations. Both countries experienced similar policies, governance structures, and cultural exchanges during the Cold War.

While Hungary shifted toward a Western-oriented democracy after 1989, its political elite, both under the MSZP and the Fidesz (Orban’s party) governments, have maintained a pragmatic relationship with Russia, which allows for cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as energy supply (where Hungary is extremely dependent) and nuclear power cooperation. In addition, Russia’s role as a champion of Christianity – particularly true under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who has emphasized Russia’s role as a protector of traditional Christian values – plays a part in shaping cultural respect between the nations. This well resonates with Hungary’s conservative government, especially on issues related to family, gender, and national sovereignty.

A similar convergence is interesting Slovakia as well. After the election of Prime Minister Robert Fico in the country, Hungary has strengthened closer diplomatic relation with its neighbor – experiencing a convergence regarding issues like energy and border security, interests in the EU and approach to the Ukrainian crisis – while the far-right nationalist movements in Europe continue to increase their popularity.
Nevertheless, Russian influence in Europe is not having the impact it aimed. The other EU members have presented a united front, making the Hungarian efforts to ease EU position toward Russia basically ineffective. With Hungary holding the European Council presidency, the situation became a bit more challenging, but the fundamental reality does not change anyway. Hungary’s close relationship with Russia is offering short-term energy and small economic advantages, while increasingly becoming risky, given Russia’s diminishing regional and global influence, and might lead to an undesired result.

On the other hand, China’s strategy for enhancing its international influence is offering Hungary a short-term alternative to diversify its need of foreign investments. The Budapest-Belgrade railway, a flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, is a key example of the opportunities that Beijing’s government is offering to many countries – particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Many other investments, such as one of the largest logistic hubs of Huawei and a factory of Chinese electric vehicle-maker BYD, have contributed to make China one of the biggest investors in Hungary during the last decade, with around €16 billion spent in the country (as reported on Politico in 2024). As highlighted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the Transition Report 2024-25, Chinese investments in the country represented 44% of all its investments in the EU plus the UK in 2023.

Despite many EU countries expressed their concern about BRI, that sounded appealing for countries like Greece and Italy as well, Orbán is calling for closer EU-China relations, while blocking several EU initiatives aimed at condemning China’s human rights abuses and trade practices. The falling soft power of China is fewer and fewer threatening the Western allies and their sphere of influence, while the open challenge to their leadership in worldwide trade – for instance, on US Dollar – is not having the effects imagined.

As multipolarity grows, Hungary’s strategy of foreign policy diversification may offer the country new opportunities, while undermining its long-term position in the European Union framework. The growing isolation of Hungary within the EU is affecting potential for economic opportunities that a deeper engagement with the Union could offer. In the long run, maintaining this closeness with Russia may limit Hungary’s strategic flexibility and isolate it diplomatically, both within Europe and on the global stage.