BY Mariam Qureshi
Another American War of Choice
This image was created using ChatGPT.
Thirteen days into the war, the United States is still trying to figure out why it started the war with Iran, and its objectives. So far, the Administration has been unable to provide a credible justification. Their claims that Iran was ‘days away’ from developing nuclear weapons – even though Trump himself claimed to have ‘obliterated’ their nuclear capabilities last June – and building long-range ballistic missiles to target the U.S. and its assets, were proven false by the U.S. intelligence sources. Iran itself was not posturing for war anyway; if it were, its response after the attack on its nuclear sites in June would not have been merely symbolic. After the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran elected his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the new Ayatollah. If regime change was the end goal, it is not working either, at least so far.
The U.S. is not the only country bombing Iran.
One prevalent opinion is that the U.S. is fighting Israel’s war, as interpreted by Marco Rubio’s statement that the U.S. acted in self-defense, knowing Iran would have attacked American forces following an attack from Israel (the imminent threat from Iran was debunked by the Pentagon, and Rubio backtracked as well). Regardless of the cause, the war does help Israel. It has seen Iran as an existential threat, not least because of the verbal attacks hurled at Israel from Tehran, but because of the active Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah fighting Israel in Gaza and Lebanon, respectively, which also impedes its efforts to expand its borders under the ‘Greater Israel’ project.
But this does not mean that the U.S. does not have its share of grievances with Iran, nor does this mean that the U.S. has always provided blanket support to Israeli ambitions.
The U.S.–Iran Strife
Assuming that the end goal of the war is regime change, this is not the first time the United States has meddled in Iranian affairs to change its leadership. In 1953, Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran’s then democratically elected Prime Minister, refused to cooperate with the British to reach an amicable deal for British Petroleum (previously AIOC) after nationalizing Iranian oil resources in 1951. The British convinced Eisenhower to let CIA depose Mossadegh and re-install the dynastic rule under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (the Shah of Iran), thus sowing the seeds for anti-American sentiment in Iran.
Pahlavi started the ‘White Revolution’, which sought to modernize and industrialize Iranian society. It was also then that the U.S. provided Iran with its first nuclear research reactor and enriched uranium for civilian use under Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program. However, in 1974, after India’s successful test, the Iranian Government claimed that “Iran is not thinking of building nuclear weapons but may revise its policy … if other non-nuclear nations do”. CIA estimates from the same year also concluded that “if other countries [proceed] with nuclear weapons [there is] no doubt that Iran will follow suit”. Despite these statements and assessments, both the Ford and Carter Administrations continued to supply technology to support the Iranian nuclear program, while “restrict[ing] Iran’s ability to produce… any nuclear weapons… using U.S. supplied material without Washington’s “agreement”. At the same time, despite the growth rate reaching nearly 10%, there was widespread inequality and resentment within Iran, which ultimately resulted in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of Reza Pahlavi.
Within the Cold War context, the pre-revolutionary Iran was a strategic asset that the then-Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, sought to preserve for three reasons. First, the Shah proved to be a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Second, its geographic location – the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz – was essential for oil shipping, along with its own oil resources. Third, as a non-Arab and Shia-majority country, it was a decent counterweight to the Arab nationalism on the rise among Sunni-majority Arab states. But even Kissinger did not anticipate the revolution, which was based on anti-Americanism.
Under the Ayatollah’s rule, relations with the U.S. were tense. Barring the support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the infamous hostage crisis of 1979, where 52 American diplomats and civilians were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for 444 days, led to a breakdown of diplomatic ties between the two states. And the U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), even when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iranians, further increased Iranian distrust of Americans. Even though the Reagan Administration covertly supplied weapons to Iran (initially through Israel), thus triggering the infamous Iran-Contra Scandal, the mistrust was sown. To be clear, the Americans did not enthusiastically cheer for an Iraqi victory, but they also did not want an Iranian victory; as Kissinger reportedly said, “it is a pity both cannot lose”.
The strategic significance of Iran had not diminished for Washington, but it was now dealing with a regime pursuing actions contrary to American interests. Nonetheless, the American approach toward Iran varied significantly. For example, Washington’s assertion that Iran could not possess nuclear weapons was vague at best. In the early years after the revolution, this was interpreted as no nuclear potential at all. However, military action was ruled out (for example, by Clinton) in favour of protests, sanctions, and embargoes, and possible diplomatic efforts.
Even amidst chants of ‘Death to America’, there were subtle efforts made to reset ties with the sanctions-crippled Iran. For example, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami proposed the ‘dialogue among civilizations’, which was harshly rejected by the then President George W. Bush, who proclaimed Iran was part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘state sponsor of terror’, which cannot be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.
But this was not a blanket consensus on how to deal with Iran. Under President Barack Obama (and Joe Biden), the assertion that Iran could not possess nuclear weapons was interpreted differently. There was potential to accept Iran as a threshold state like Japan, and a diplomatic breakthrough occurred under President Hassan Rouhani when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Nuclear Deal was signed in 2015.
All of this crumbled under the first mandate of Donald Trump, who pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA deal during his first term, and now, during the second term, first authorized strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and now initiated a war with Iran, which probably serves Israel but certainly undermines the United States. Was the U.S. then entrapped by its ally (Israel) into a war?
U.S.–Israel Discord
Under the shadow of the Shoah, Israel interprets statements from Iran calling for an ‘end to Israel’ as an ‘existential threat’. This, together with how Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas fight Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, respectively, makes the thought of an empowered nuclear Iran unacceptable. But Israel does not only see Iran as a threat; it does not want any Arab states in the region to possess nuclear weapons either. This is why Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and, in 2007, bombed a nuclear facility in Syria. Iran and its proxies are perceived as a major irritant preventing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from making progress on the ‘Greater Israel’ project, whereby Israel expands its borders in the region. Until now.
Israel, however, despite being a close ally to the U.S., has not always been able to convince the U.S. when both disagreed on aims and policies. Oftentimes, the U.S. stood up to tame its ally. The U.S. arms embargo after the 1948 Israel-Palestine war, the explicit opposition of the U.S. to support the joint British-French-Israeli assault on Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, President Kennedy’s criticism over the Israeli nuclear weapons program, and even last October, when the U.S. imposed a ceasefire to the war in Gaza, despite Israeli concerns, are sufficient examples to highlight how the U.S. does not always simply toe the Israeli line.
But then why now?
This is hardly America’s first unpopular war or failed effort at regime change. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chile, Guatemala, Grenada, and the list goes on. Nor is it the first time that the so-called rules and norms of the international system have been disregarded. For example, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003 were both initiated without United Nations Security Council approval. But here is the thing about norms and rules in the international system – they are intersubjective, meaning their legitimacy depends on how widely they are perceived and accepted. States do not invoke them in rhetoric for normative reasons but only manipulate them for strategic ones. Convincing the audience that they are pursuing a policy in accordance with the norms and rules gives their actions legitimacy.
What is different now is President Trump’s blatant disregard for even paying lip service to prevailing norms and rules, even if it is only for rhetorical effect, to lower social costs to reputation and credibility. That has been his style of Presidency so far: he has actively disregarded the old alliance system (threats to pull out of NATO, criticism of Europe, threats to take over Greenland from a NATO member state), tried to revamp the economic order through tariffs, and now rewriting the rules of engagement per his “own morality”. Exactly why Trump felt it appropriate to say “nobody is going to tell us we cannot use it”, “we can fly in and use it,” when Spain refused the United States access to its bases.
What this is doing is only accelerating the American decline: as criticism against the war mounts domestically, questions begin to rise on the legality of the war, the so-called European allies are sidelined, and its so-called Arab allies are in fact abandoned, it is still unclear what Trump seeks to achieve, other than to prove that he is powerful enough to do “what no other U.S. President could have done”.
The U.S. is not the only country bombing Iran.
One prevalent opinion is that the U.S. is fighting Israel’s war, as interpreted by Marco Rubio’s statement that the U.S. acted in self-defense, knowing Iran would have attacked American forces following an attack from Israel (the imminent threat from Iran was debunked by the Pentagon, and Rubio backtracked as well). Regardless of the cause, the war does help Israel. It has seen Iran as an existential threat, not least because of the verbal attacks hurled at Israel from Tehran, but because of the active Iranian support for Hamas and Hezbollah fighting Israel in Gaza and Lebanon, respectively, which also impedes its efforts to expand its borders under the ‘Greater Israel’ project.
But this does not mean that the U.S. does not have its share of grievances with Iran, nor does this mean that the U.S. has always provided blanket support to Israeli ambitions.
The U.S.–Iran Strife
Assuming that the end goal of the war is regime change, this is not the first time the United States has meddled in Iranian affairs to change its leadership. In 1953, Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran’s then democratically elected Prime Minister, refused to cooperate with the British to reach an amicable deal for British Petroleum (previously AIOC) after nationalizing Iranian oil resources in 1951. The British convinced Eisenhower to let CIA depose Mossadegh and re-install the dynastic rule under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (the Shah of Iran), thus sowing the seeds for anti-American sentiment in Iran.
Pahlavi started the ‘White Revolution’, which sought to modernize and industrialize Iranian society. It was also then that the U.S. provided Iran with its first nuclear research reactor and enriched uranium for civilian use under Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace Program. However, in 1974, after India’s successful test, the Iranian Government claimed that “Iran is not thinking of building nuclear weapons but may revise its policy … if other non-nuclear nations do”. CIA estimates from the same year also concluded that “if other countries [proceed] with nuclear weapons [there is] no doubt that Iran will follow suit”. Despite these statements and assessments, both the Ford and Carter Administrations continued to supply technology to support the Iranian nuclear program, while “restrict[ing] Iran’s ability to produce… any nuclear weapons… using U.S. supplied material without Washington’s “agreement”. At the same time, despite the growth rate reaching nearly 10%, there was widespread inequality and resentment within Iran, which ultimately resulted in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of Reza Pahlavi.
Within the Cold War context, the pre-revolutionary Iran was a strategic asset that the then-Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, sought to preserve for three reasons. First, the Shah proved to be a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Second, its geographic location – the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz – was essential for oil shipping, along with its own oil resources. Third, as a non-Arab and Shia-majority country, it was a decent counterweight to the Arab nationalism on the rise among Sunni-majority Arab states. But even Kissinger did not anticipate the revolution, which was based on anti-Americanism.
Under the Ayatollah’s rule, relations with the U.S. were tense. Barring the support for Hezbollah and Hamas, the infamous hostage crisis of 1979, where 52 American diplomats and civilians were held hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran for 444 days, led to a breakdown of diplomatic ties between the two states. And the U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), even when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iranians, further increased Iranian distrust of Americans. Even though the Reagan Administration covertly supplied weapons to Iran (initially through Israel), thus triggering the infamous Iran-Contra Scandal, the mistrust was sown. To be clear, the Americans did not enthusiastically cheer for an Iraqi victory, but they also did not want an Iranian victory; as Kissinger reportedly said, “it is a pity both cannot lose”.
The strategic significance of Iran had not diminished for Washington, but it was now dealing with a regime pursuing actions contrary to American interests. Nonetheless, the American approach toward Iran varied significantly. For example, Washington’s assertion that Iran could not possess nuclear weapons was vague at best. In the early years after the revolution, this was interpreted as no nuclear potential at all. However, military action was ruled out (for example, by Clinton) in favour of protests, sanctions, and embargoes, and possible diplomatic efforts.
Even amidst chants of ‘Death to America’, there were subtle efforts made to reset ties with the sanctions-crippled Iran. For example, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami proposed the ‘dialogue among civilizations’, which was harshly rejected by the then President George W. Bush, who proclaimed Iran was part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘state sponsor of terror’, which cannot be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.
But this was not a blanket consensus on how to deal with Iran. Under President Barack Obama (and Joe Biden), the assertion that Iran could not possess nuclear weapons was interpreted differently. There was potential to accept Iran as a threshold state like Japan, and a diplomatic breakthrough occurred under President Hassan Rouhani when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Nuclear Deal was signed in 2015.
All of this crumbled under the first mandate of Donald Trump, who pulled the U.S. out of the JCPOA deal during his first term, and now, during the second term, first authorized strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, and now initiated a war with Iran, which probably serves Israel but certainly undermines the United States. Was the U.S. then entrapped by its ally (Israel) into a war?
U.S.–Israel Discord
Under the shadow of the Shoah, Israel interprets statements from Iran calling for an ‘end to Israel’ as an ‘existential threat’. This, together with how Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Hamas fight Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, respectively, makes the thought of an empowered nuclear Iran unacceptable. But Israel does not only see Iran as a threat; it does not want any Arab states in the region to possess nuclear weapons either. This is why Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and, in 2007, bombed a nuclear facility in Syria. Iran and its proxies are perceived as a major irritant preventing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from making progress on the ‘Greater Israel’ project, whereby Israel expands its borders in the region. Until now.
Israel, however, despite being a close ally to the U.S., has not always been able to convince the U.S. when both disagreed on aims and policies. Oftentimes, the U.S. stood up to tame its ally. The U.S. arms embargo after the 1948 Israel-Palestine war, the explicit opposition of the U.S. to support the joint British-French-Israeli assault on Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956, President Kennedy’s criticism over the Israeli nuclear weapons program, and even last October, when the U.S. imposed a ceasefire to the war in Gaza, despite Israeli concerns, are sufficient examples to highlight how the U.S. does not always simply toe the Israeli line.
But then why now?
This is hardly America’s first unpopular war or failed effort at regime change. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chile, Guatemala, Grenada, and the list goes on. Nor is it the first time that the so-called rules and norms of the international system have been disregarded. For example, the Kosovo War in 1999 and the Iraq War in 2003 were both initiated without United Nations Security Council approval. But here is the thing about norms and rules in the international system – they are intersubjective, meaning their legitimacy depends on how widely they are perceived and accepted. States do not invoke them in rhetoric for normative reasons but only manipulate them for strategic ones. Convincing the audience that they are pursuing a policy in accordance with the norms and rules gives their actions legitimacy.
What is different now is President Trump’s blatant disregard for even paying lip service to prevailing norms and rules, even if it is only for rhetorical effect, to lower social costs to reputation and credibility. That has been his style of Presidency so far: he has actively disregarded the old alliance system (threats to pull out of NATO, criticism of Europe, threats to take over Greenland from a NATO member state), tried to revamp the economic order through tariffs, and now rewriting the rules of engagement per his “own morality”. Exactly why Trump felt it appropriate to say “nobody is going to tell us we cannot use it”, “we can fly in and use it,” when Spain refused the United States access to its bases.
What this is doing is only accelerating the American decline: as criticism against the war mounts domestically, questions begin to rise on the legality of the war, the so-called European allies are sidelined, and its so-called Arab allies are in fact abandoned, it is still unclear what Trump seeks to achieve, other than to prove that he is powerful enough to do “what no other U.S. President could have done”.
What about the Gulf States?
Although the Gulf States are divided because of their varied interests, they share the Israeli vision (along with Turkey) that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons. But this does not automatically mean that they want to see a strong, offensive, and nuclear Israel either. In fact, they stand to lose much more from the war. As retaliation for the U.S. and Israeli strikes, Iran targeted the American bases in Gulf states. As Israeli attacks spread to include infrastructural facilities, so does the Iranian response within the Gulf. And the Gulf states are once again reminded that the U.S. does not rank them terribly high on its priority list.
Indeed, for Israel, things started to fall in place after the October 7 Hamas attacks, which provided the pretext to attack Gaza and weaken Hamas, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now Iran. As Israel pursues its grander ambition in the region, Gulf security and economy stand to suffer the most.
Although the Gulf States are divided because of their varied interests, they share the Israeli vision (along with Turkey) that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons. But this does not automatically mean that they want to see a strong, offensive, and nuclear Israel either. In fact, they stand to lose much more from the war. As retaliation for the U.S. and Israeli strikes, Iran targeted the American bases in Gulf states. As Israeli attacks spread to include infrastructural facilities, so does the Iranian response within the Gulf. And the Gulf states are once again reminded that the U.S. does not rank them terribly high on its priority list.
Indeed, for Israel, things started to fall in place after the October 7 Hamas attacks, which provided the pretext to attack Gaza and weaken Hamas, and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now Iran. As Israel pursues its grander ambition in the region, Gulf security and economy stand to suffer the most.
What about the others?
For the so-called European allies, they are constantly rebuked and insulted: the United Kingdom for doing too little too late, and Spain for refusing altogether. Admittedly, their support is half-hearted at best, but Trump has already signaled that for him, they are no longer a priority. For example, France admitted that it was not involved in the decision-making or was not told in advance about the attack. If these European ‘allies’ think that by tacitly supporting Trump, they can extract favors for the Ukraine War, they need to think again. If anyone is a clear victor, it is Russia, benefiting from the surge in oil prices, and a distracted America in another war means weakened support for Ukraine.
Although for now China is bearing the economic impact, if the war widens and is prolonged, and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, it will begin to suffer from disrupted oil, trade, financial markets, and supply chains. Other Asian statesare beginning to feel the economic pain of the war, as they ration fuel. But for Japan and South Korea in particular, the threat is not merely economic. As the U.S. relocates its defense weapons systems from South Korea to the Middle East, and continues to expend weapons faster than they can be replenished, the ‘allies’ fear an increasing security threat from China. It is quite possible that China may see an exhausted U.S. as an opportunity to pursue its interests in Taiwan and the South China Sea. And interestingly, after months of grappling with American tariffs as punishment for importing Russian oil, Washington has now been forced to grant India a waiver to purchase Russian oil.
For the so-called European allies, they are constantly rebuked and insulted: the United Kingdom for doing too little too late, and Spain for refusing altogether. Admittedly, their support is half-hearted at best, but Trump has already signaled that for him, they are no longer a priority. For example, France admitted that it was not involved in the decision-making or was not told in advance about the attack. If these European ‘allies’ think that by tacitly supporting Trump, they can extract favors for the Ukraine War, they need to think again. If anyone is a clear victor, it is Russia, benefiting from the surge in oil prices, and a distracted America in another war means weakened support for Ukraine.
Although for now China is bearing the economic impact, if the war widens and is prolonged, and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, it will begin to suffer from disrupted oil, trade, financial markets, and supply chains. Other Asian statesare beginning to feel the economic pain of the war, as they ration fuel. But for Japan and South Korea in particular, the threat is not merely economic. As the U.S. relocates its defense weapons systems from South Korea to the Middle East, and continues to expend weapons faster than they can be replenished, the ‘allies’ fear an increasing security threat from China. It is quite possible that China may see an exhausted U.S. as an opportunity to pursue its interests in Taiwan and the South China Sea. And interestingly, after months of grappling with American tariffs as punishment for importing Russian oil, Washington has now been forced to grant India a waiver to purchase Russian oil.
Oil product exports transiting the Strait of Hormuz by destination (2025). Source: International Energy Agency
And finally, what about Iran? After the 12-day war between Israel and Iran last year, Robert A. Pape argued that even if the aim is to topple the government and destroy nuclear sites, mere airstrikes never achieve the target, without a highly unlikely ground invasion. If anything, he continued, it “is likely to harden Iran’s resolve and produce the opposite of its intended results”. This much is true today.
Perhaps the regime will fall from exhaustion, or it may persevere, and the conflict will continue. Even if it falls, there is no credible alternative to lead a now more severely weakened Iran. Furthermore, fear of foreign rule often hardens nationalistic resolve. The war would inevitably only exacerbate the sentiments it ostensibly sought to subdue. This is also true for the Arab-Israeli tensions, which will also perhaps only accentuate as Israel continues its assault in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and even Syria, all while fighting this war in Iran. Once again, the lesson must be repeated for the U.S. that one cannot bomb ideologies out of existence, nor bomb its way to peace.
Perhaps the regime will fall from exhaustion, or it may persevere, and the conflict will continue. Even if it falls, there is no credible alternative to lead a now more severely weakened Iran. Furthermore, fear of foreign rule often hardens nationalistic resolve. The war would inevitably only exacerbate the sentiments it ostensibly sought to subdue. This is also true for the Arab-Israeli tensions, which will also perhaps only accentuate as Israel continues its assault in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and even Syria, all while fighting this war in Iran. Once again, the lesson must be repeated for the U.S. that one cannot bomb ideologies out of existence, nor bomb its way to peace.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.