BY MARIAM QURESHI
India’s Multi-Alignment Amidst the U.S. Decline
This image is AI-generated.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been unusually busy. When he is not on three-nation visits to Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand, or a five-nation tour to the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and the UAE, he is welcoming President Macron, Prime Minister Carney, Prime Minister Takaichi (among leaders from Bhutan, Vietnam and other states) to New Delhi. Significantly, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio also visited India ahead of the QUAD meeting to improve ties after a year of tense relations between New Delhi and Washington over tariffs, imports of Russian oil, and disagreements regarding President Trump’s role in ceasefire negotiations between India and Pakistan in May 2025.
It is simplistic to say that India is merely strengthening its Indo-Pacific Strategy to counter China. For example, it would be inaccurate to overlook India’s new “strategic partnership” with Greece and Cyprus, the economic deal with the UAE, and the visit to Israel shortly before the beginning of the Iran War. It is also simplistic to say that this is a manifestation of India’s multi-alignment policy, developed to preserve its strategic autonomy by diversifying economic and security partners. Reality, as always, is much more complex.
India’s multi-regional alignments are taking place amidst an accelerated American decline, which is not simply an Indian concern. The unreliability and unpredictability of the United States, particularly under the Second Trump Administration, have elevated fears, prompting the U.S. “allies” and others to find alternatives to meet their trade and defence requirements.
India, China, and the Indo-Pacific
Like China, India also aspires to lead the so-called Global South and seeks “superpower” status—whatever that may mean—which adds to the strategic tensions between both neighbors. And border disputes, questions about the sovereignty of Tibet, India granting refuge to the Dalai Lama, and New Delhi’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Sea only complicate their relations. They have gone to war in 1962, and both armies clashed at the shared border in recent years.
This strategic rivalry with China has proven to be a vital common denominator bringing India closer to states in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe, all of whom are also cautious of China’s rise. In 2007, the United States, India, Australia and Japan met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) — an initiative to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. After remaining dormant for nearly a decade, the QUAD was revived in 2017, but its members have only intermittently coordinated on economic and security initiatives. Fears that the QUAD was once again abandoned rose when the group had not met since September 2024, until recently, in India in May 2026. But just because they met does not automatically mean that the four states are on the same page in countering China.
As with any other geopolitical event, contexts change over time. This time, the U.S. position is further weakened. By consistently berating and threatening allies for example with annexation of Greenland and withdrawal from NATO, and virtually abandoning the “allies” in the Pacific, and the Gulf during the War on Iran, the U.S. has isolated itself. And if that is insufficient, President Trump’s ideas of enacting ‘spheres of influence’ or forming a ‘G2’ with China have further increased anxiety within these allies. The fact that multiple voices emerge from Washington over every U.S. foreign policy decision, which can change by the end of the day, does not convince other states to rely on the U.S.
Even so, some in Washington think that the U.S. must make strides to assert itself and to show that it still has friends and can exercise a degree of influence over them. And this is why Secretary of State Marco Rubio had an extended stay in India before the QUAD meeting. But trying to mend ties with Delhi while expressing “disappointment in European and NATO allies for failing to step up during the Iran War” does not make the U.S. any less unreliable.
And this is also why even the QUAD members are wary of relying on QUAD. Hurling abuse at allies is one thing, but President Trump’s decision to relocate the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Lincoln, Marine troops, and Patriot defence systems from the Pacific, Japan, and South Korea, respectively, has been the most telling sign for states within and outside QUAD that the U.S. and its security guarantees are unreliable. If this was not enough, President Trump has halted a multi-billion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan, which he referred to as a “good bargaining chip” while dealing with China, shortly after the Trump-Xi Summit in China in May this year.
Consequently, states are scrambling to find alternatives. Japan, for example, scrapped its decades-long restriction on global arms export. The Japanese cabinet approved a $58 billion defence budget and vowed to respond militarily to any Chinese aggression against Taiwan. South Korea is increasing regional alignment with Vietnam by signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in April 2026. And given India’s geostrategic positioning, its sizeable military potential and nuclear capabilities, and the common China factor, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan have all elevated ties to ‘strategic partnerships’ with promises on enhancing trade and defence engagements.
For some, this may be more significant than the other. Japan, for example, views India as a substantial element in its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision where India’s eastern seaboard will grant access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. This vision dates to Shinzo Abe, who considered the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space. But India has emerged as significant not just for the states within the Indo-Pacific.
It is simplistic to say that India is merely strengthening its Indo-Pacific Strategy to counter China. For example, it would be inaccurate to overlook India’s new “strategic partnership” with Greece and Cyprus, the economic deal with the UAE, and the visit to Israel shortly before the beginning of the Iran War. It is also simplistic to say that this is a manifestation of India’s multi-alignment policy, developed to preserve its strategic autonomy by diversifying economic and security partners. Reality, as always, is much more complex.
India’s multi-regional alignments are taking place amidst an accelerated American decline, which is not simply an Indian concern. The unreliability and unpredictability of the United States, particularly under the Second Trump Administration, have elevated fears, prompting the U.S. “allies” and others to find alternatives to meet their trade and defence requirements.
India, China, and the Indo-Pacific
Like China, India also aspires to lead the so-called Global South and seeks “superpower” status—whatever that may mean—which adds to the strategic tensions between both neighbors. And border disputes, questions about the sovereignty of Tibet, India granting refuge to the Dalai Lama, and New Delhi’s stance on Taiwan and the South China Sea only complicate their relations. They have gone to war in 1962, and both armies clashed at the shared border in recent years.
This strategic rivalry with China has proven to be a vital common denominator bringing India closer to states in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe, all of whom are also cautious of China’s rise. In 2007, the United States, India, Australia and Japan met on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Manila to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) — an initiative to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. After remaining dormant for nearly a decade, the QUAD was revived in 2017, but its members have only intermittently coordinated on economic and security initiatives. Fears that the QUAD was once again abandoned rose when the group had not met since September 2024, until recently, in India in May 2026. But just because they met does not automatically mean that the four states are on the same page in countering China.
As with any other geopolitical event, contexts change over time. This time, the U.S. position is further weakened. By consistently berating and threatening allies for example with annexation of Greenland and withdrawal from NATO, and virtually abandoning the “allies” in the Pacific, and the Gulf during the War on Iran, the U.S. has isolated itself. And if that is insufficient, President Trump’s ideas of enacting ‘spheres of influence’ or forming a ‘G2’ with China have further increased anxiety within these allies. The fact that multiple voices emerge from Washington over every U.S. foreign policy decision, which can change by the end of the day, does not convince other states to rely on the U.S.
Even so, some in Washington think that the U.S. must make strides to assert itself and to show that it still has friends and can exercise a degree of influence over them. And this is why Secretary of State Marco Rubio had an extended stay in India before the QUAD meeting. But trying to mend ties with Delhi while expressing “disappointment in European and NATO allies for failing to step up during the Iran War” does not make the U.S. any less unreliable.
And this is also why even the QUAD members are wary of relying on QUAD. Hurling abuse at allies is one thing, but President Trump’s decision to relocate the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Lincoln, Marine troops, and Patriot defence systems from the Pacific, Japan, and South Korea, respectively, has been the most telling sign for states within and outside QUAD that the U.S. and its security guarantees are unreliable. If this was not enough, President Trump has halted a multi-billion-dollar arms sale to Taiwan, which he referred to as a “good bargaining chip” while dealing with China, shortly after the Trump-Xi Summit in China in May this year.
Consequently, states are scrambling to find alternatives. Japan, for example, scrapped its decades-long restriction on global arms export. The Japanese cabinet approved a $58 billion defence budget and vowed to respond militarily to any Chinese aggression against Taiwan. South Korea is increasing regional alignment with Vietnam by signing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in April 2026. And given India’s geostrategic positioning, its sizeable military potential and nuclear capabilities, and the common China factor, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan have all elevated ties to ‘strategic partnerships’ with promises on enhancing trade and defence engagements.
For some, this may be more significant than the other. Japan, for example, views India as a substantial element in its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision where India’s eastern seaboard will grant access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. This vision dates to Shinzo Abe, who considered the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single strategic space. But India has emerged as significant not just for the states within the Indo-Pacific.
Map highlighting the alignments formed between countries across regions.
Source: AI-generated (Gemini)
Source: AI-generated (Gemini)
What about the others?
In January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a significant speech at the World Economic Forum. He lamented that now there is a “rupture” where “American hegemony [which] helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security” (for its allies at least) is now “using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited” (against these very allies). Consequently, he urged the “middle powers of the world” (whatever that entails) to “rapidly diversify”.
India approached Europe, and more specifically France, first when it wanted to diversify its arms imports to lessen reliance on Russia. This has since expanded, particularly with two significant Free Trade Agreements with the UK and the EU. Ostensibly to expand trade and economic partnership within the region, India has approached the Nordic Countries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Denmark, in addition to other European states such as Italy and the Netherlands.
But this engagement with the region is not limited to trade. India and Germany may announce a submarine deal worth $8 billion this summer as Germany seeks military expansion. The deal, which has been under negotiation since January 2025, is expected to include technology transfer for Mumbai-based production of at least six submarines, allowing the Indian Navy to compete with China (and Pakistan) in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership with Germany is momentous for India because it involves technology transfer, a possibility for India to become ‘self-reliant’ and build domestic capabilities. Although at such a nascent level, it would still take time for India to make a sizeable impact, and persistent institutional delays and technological gaps may limit the extent to which this ‘self-reliance’ is realized.
But even with other engagements, there are two important considerations. First, the extent to which these trade agreements will prove beneficial depends on how flexible India’s protectionist economy, mired with bureaucratic red tape, is willing to be (not much). In any case, it remains to be seen if these “strategic partnerships” will evolve into more significant foreign direct investments (FDIs). But beyond all of this, India’s close ties with Russia remain a significant concern. Of course, absent U.S. security guarantees, this may be used as a bargaining chip or a channel for communication by Europe rather than as an excuse to keep India at bay – time will tell. But one thing is certain: in international politics, sometimes agreements and deals carry signals, if nothing else.
This is a signal to the U.S. by its ‘partners’ and ‘allies’ that they have options. But simply because India is forming these alignments does not mean that it will abandon its old partner. Russia and India continue to cooperate to build advanced warships for the Indian Navy, with two scheduled to be built in India. Additionally, Indian refiners are exporting oil and gas to Russia amidst the ongoing energy crisis resulting from the Ukraine War. But can India sustain these multi-alignments?
India’s waning influence in its backyard
India once dominated the small states in its backyard, but this has shifted in China’s favour. China has outpaced India in investment and aid, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. For example, Sri Lanka, once closer to New Delhi, awarded the Hambantota Port Project to China, signaling waning Indian influence in the country. Likewise, in Bangladesh, although India is attempting to reassert itself and mend ties after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster by appointing a New High Commissioner – a West Bengal politician versed in Bangla rather than a career diplomat – and resuming tourist visas. Of course, this is insufficient in pulling Bangladesh away from China; e.g., Dhaka has awarded the sought-after Mongla Port Project to China, previously reserved for India. It has also welcomed Chinese contribution in the Testa River Project Restoration, which sits uncomfortably close to India’s Siliguri Corridor. But Indian efforts show that New Delhi does not want to be eliminated from within its backyard.
China is also working with Myanmar to develop an economic corridor which would give Beijing direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean and an alternative to the Malacca Strait. However, how successful this may be remains to be seen given Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. Nonetheless, this has important implications for India.
The Iran War has reiterated the geopolitical significance of control of waterways. India has already been ‘encircled’ by China’s “string of pearls” strategy where China has gained access to critical ports in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, for greater influence over sea routes and shipping lanes. China’s growing influence around the Siliguri Corridor, or ‘chicken neck ’, which connects India to its northeastern states, borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, and serves as the exclusive transit route for trade, defence, and communication, is an equal security concern for New Delhi.
In January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney gave a significant speech at the World Economic Forum. He lamented that now there is a “rupture” where “American hegemony [which] helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security” (for its allies at least) is now “using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited” (against these very allies). Consequently, he urged the “middle powers of the world” (whatever that entails) to “rapidly diversify”.
India approached Europe, and more specifically France, first when it wanted to diversify its arms imports to lessen reliance on Russia. This has since expanded, particularly with two significant Free Trade Agreements with the UK and the EU. Ostensibly to expand trade and economic partnership within the region, India has approached the Nordic Countries of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Denmark, in addition to other European states such as Italy and the Netherlands.
But this engagement with the region is not limited to trade. India and Germany may announce a submarine deal worth $8 billion this summer as Germany seeks military expansion. The deal, which has been under negotiation since January 2025, is expected to include technology transfer for Mumbai-based production of at least six submarines, allowing the Indian Navy to compete with China (and Pakistan) in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership with Germany is momentous for India because it involves technology transfer, a possibility for India to become ‘self-reliant’ and build domestic capabilities. Although at such a nascent level, it would still take time for India to make a sizeable impact, and persistent institutional delays and technological gaps may limit the extent to which this ‘self-reliance’ is realized.
But even with other engagements, there are two important considerations. First, the extent to which these trade agreements will prove beneficial depends on how flexible India’s protectionist economy, mired with bureaucratic red tape, is willing to be (not much). In any case, it remains to be seen if these “strategic partnerships” will evolve into more significant foreign direct investments (FDIs). But beyond all of this, India’s close ties with Russia remain a significant concern. Of course, absent U.S. security guarantees, this may be used as a bargaining chip or a channel for communication by Europe rather than as an excuse to keep India at bay – time will tell. But one thing is certain: in international politics, sometimes agreements and deals carry signals, if nothing else.
This is a signal to the U.S. by its ‘partners’ and ‘allies’ that they have options. But simply because India is forming these alignments does not mean that it will abandon its old partner. Russia and India continue to cooperate to build advanced warships for the Indian Navy, with two scheduled to be built in India. Additionally, Indian refiners are exporting oil and gas to Russia amidst the ongoing energy crisis resulting from the Ukraine War. But can India sustain these multi-alignments?
India’s waning influence in its backyard
India once dominated the small states in its backyard, but this has shifted in China’s favour. China has outpaced India in investment and aid, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. For example, Sri Lanka, once closer to New Delhi, awarded the Hambantota Port Project to China, signaling waning Indian influence in the country. Likewise, in Bangladesh, although India is attempting to reassert itself and mend ties after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster by appointing a New High Commissioner – a West Bengal politician versed in Bangla rather than a career diplomat – and resuming tourist visas. Of course, this is insufficient in pulling Bangladesh away from China; e.g., Dhaka has awarded the sought-after Mongla Port Project to China, previously reserved for India. It has also welcomed Chinese contribution in the Testa River Project Restoration, which sits uncomfortably close to India’s Siliguri Corridor. But Indian efforts show that New Delhi does not want to be eliminated from within its backyard.
China is also working with Myanmar to develop an economic corridor which would give Beijing direct access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean and an alternative to the Malacca Strait. However, how successful this may be remains to be seen given Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. Nonetheless, this has important implications for India.
The Iran War has reiterated the geopolitical significance of control of waterways. India has already been ‘encircled’ by China’s “string of pearls” strategy where China has gained access to critical ports in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal, for greater influence over sea routes and shipping lanes. China’s growing influence around the Siliguri Corridor, or ‘chicken neck ’, which connects India to its northeastern states, borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, and serves as the exclusive transit route for trade, defence, and communication, is an equal security concern for New Delhi.
Map of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the “Chicken’s Neck”.
Source: AI-generated (Gemini).
Source: AI-generated (Gemini).
Map highlighting the main ports where China has invested, creating a ‘String of Pearls’ around India.
Source: AI-generated (Gemini).
Source: AI-generated (Gemini).
Despite all this, South and Southeast Asian states have not abandoned India altogether. Recently, Bhutan, Vietnam, and Myanmar have visited India to forge ‘partnerships’ to safeguard their security, trade and energy commitments, in a bid to ensure that their countries do not become overly reliant on China. Additionally, Indonesia, which has traditionally seen Beijing as an important partner for economic development, has signed an ‘agreement’ of $630 million for the BrahMos cruise missile system and collaborations on critical minerals and digital infrastructure with India. While it remains to be seen to what extent these agreements will be materialized, it is nonetheless a signal that India has not been completely abandoned. It is also a signal that India is putting effort into not being isolated, particularly in terms of access to critical chokepoints, e.g., the Strait of Malacca.
Of course losing its influence within its backyard puts a question mark on India’s ability to uphold all these alignments from the Middle East, Europe, to the Pacific, but losing influence within its backyard is not India’s biggest concern right now.
The Pakistan Factor
The India-Pakistan rivalry once again peaked last year in May when both nuclear-armed rivals exchanged fire for four days. Since then, the relationship between the two has been at its lowest ebb, with no official diplomatic engagement but a continuously simmering feud over Kashmir, terrorism, and the Indus Water Treaty. This conflict, however, put Pakistan back on the map.
President Trump took credit for the ceasefire, and Pakistan’s leadership quickly realized that stroking Trump’s ego would put Pakistan back in Washington’s good graces. Ties between Islamabad and Washington had been rocky since the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, as Washington accused Pakistan of continuing to harbor terrorists and their networks, with American aid to Pakistan significantly reduced since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
The most significant diplomatic ‘success’ came with the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defence Agreement in September 2025. Since then, Pakistan has emerged as a key player in the region’s ongoing chaos. So far, as one of the few countries Trump has not explicitly hurled abuse against, Pakistan has attempted to ‘mediate’ the Iran War. Of course, the mediation efforts were bound to fail. Still, it provided Pakistan the opportunity to strengthen ties with Turkey and Egypt – along with Saudi Arabia – both of whom have expressed a desire to join the Pak-Saudi Defence Pact. This has culminated in a recent bilateral trade agreement with Turkey.
Although it is unlikely that Pakistan would want itself in the middle of a Middle Eastern war, since its army is already engaged in conflict with the two neighbors, Afghanistan and India, these diplomatic efforts have (of course) stirred responses from other states as well. For example, UAE, the archrival of Saudi Arabia, is inching closer to India with an economic deal (and a promise of a defence agreement) in January this year. Saudi Arabia and UAE are embroiled in proxy wars throughout the region from Sudan to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and Pakistan’s military support for Saudi Arabia is bound to be used against the UAE. Not to mention the independent deals either finalized or in the final stages for Pakistan arms exports to Libya, Sudan, Myanmar, Nigeria and Azerbaijan, and even Bangladesh.
But this is not the only dimension to the shifting alignments in the Middle East and beyond. Before the Iran War, Prime Minister Modi visited Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel. The Israeli PM had announced his intention to “build a network of nations in or around the Middle East to collectively stand against what he called 'radical' Shia and Sunni adversaries”. Although the Sunni targets were undefined, it was clear that India would be part of the axis because it “sees eye to eye” with Israel. Indeed, the anti-Muslim stance of both leaders has brought them considerably closer. Pakistan – the Sunni nuclear-armed state – views this with concern, especially since there is a good chance the alignment could be used against Pakistan, as was the case during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 2025 when India used Israeli drones to attack Pakistan.
But as Pakistan draws closer to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, India is developing closer ties with their archrivals in the region, the UAE, Greece, and Cyprus. In May 2026, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides visited India, where both countries elevated their ties to a “strategic partnership”. Greece and India did the same during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Athens in 2023. In a similar vein, so has Israel advanced its ties with Greece and Cyprus in a bid to counter Turkey in the region.
This is a natural progression of events: international politics abhors vacuum; therefore, the decline and retrenchment of the U.S. and its commitments from different regions have pushed regional states to form opportunistic alignments for short-term interests. Even if states may temporarily cooperate, they hold differing interests, reasons, and constraints in pursuing goals; therefore, this endeavor will only add to the growing instability.
Of course losing its influence within its backyard puts a question mark on India’s ability to uphold all these alignments from the Middle East, Europe, to the Pacific, but losing influence within its backyard is not India’s biggest concern right now.
The Pakistan Factor
The India-Pakistan rivalry once again peaked last year in May when both nuclear-armed rivals exchanged fire for four days. Since then, the relationship between the two has been at its lowest ebb, with no official diplomatic engagement but a continuously simmering feud over Kashmir, terrorism, and the Indus Water Treaty. This conflict, however, put Pakistan back on the map.
President Trump took credit for the ceasefire, and Pakistan’s leadership quickly realized that stroking Trump’s ego would put Pakistan back in Washington’s good graces. Ties between Islamabad and Washington had been rocky since the capture and killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, as Washington accused Pakistan of continuing to harbor terrorists and their networks, with American aid to Pakistan significantly reduced since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.
The most significant diplomatic ‘success’ came with the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Defence Agreement in September 2025. Since then, Pakistan has emerged as a key player in the region’s ongoing chaos. So far, as one of the few countries Trump has not explicitly hurled abuse against, Pakistan has attempted to ‘mediate’ the Iran War. Of course, the mediation efforts were bound to fail. Still, it provided Pakistan the opportunity to strengthen ties with Turkey and Egypt – along with Saudi Arabia – both of whom have expressed a desire to join the Pak-Saudi Defence Pact. This has culminated in a recent bilateral trade agreement with Turkey.
Although it is unlikely that Pakistan would want itself in the middle of a Middle Eastern war, since its army is already engaged in conflict with the two neighbors, Afghanistan and India, these diplomatic efforts have (of course) stirred responses from other states as well. For example, UAE, the archrival of Saudi Arabia, is inching closer to India with an economic deal (and a promise of a defence agreement) in January this year. Saudi Arabia and UAE are embroiled in proxy wars throughout the region from Sudan to Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and Pakistan’s military support for Saudi Arabia is bound to be used against the UAE. Not to mention the independent deals either finalized or in the final stages for Pakistan arms exports to Libya, Sudan, Myanmar, Nigeria and Azerbaijan, and even Bangladesh.
But this is not the only dimension to the shifting alignments in the Middle East and beyond. Before the Iran War, Prime Minister Modi visited Prime Minister Netanyahu in Israel. The Israeli PM had announced his intention to “build a network of nations in or around the Middle East to collectively stand against what he called 'radical' Shia and Sunni adversaries”. Although the Sunni targets were undefined, it was clear that India would be part of the axis because it “sees eye to eye” with Israel. Indeed, the anti-Muslim stance of both leaders has brought them considerably closer. Pakistan – the Sunni nuclear-armed state – views this with concern, especially since there is a good chance the alignment could be used against Pakistan, as was the case during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 2025 when India used Israeli drones to attack Pakistan.
But as Pakistan draws closer to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, India is developing closer ties with their archrivals in the region, the UAE, Greece, and Cyprus. In May 2026, Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides visited India, where both countries elevated their ties to a “strategic partnership”. Greece and India did the same during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Athens in 2023. In a similar vein, so has Israel advanced its ties with Greece and Cyprus in a bid to counter Turkey in the region.
***
Prime Minister Mark Carney further commented that this diversification would lead to the formation of “different coalitions for different issues”. What he did not mention was that these coalitions would be more fragile and prone to instability. Take the dynamics that entwine South Asian rivalry within Middle Eastern rivalries: instability in one region will have a spillover effect on the other region.This is a natural progression of events: international politics abhors vacuum; therefore, the decline and retrenchment of the U.S. and its commitments from different regions have pushed regional states to form opportunistic alignments for short-term interests. Even if states may temporarily cooperate, they hold differing interests, reasons, and constraints in pursuing goals; therefore, this endeavor will only add to the growing instability.
The opinions expressed in this article are of the author alone. The Spykman Center provides a neutral and non-partisan platform to learn how to make geopolitical analysis. It acknowledges how diverse perspectives impact geopolitical analyses, without necessarily endorsing them.